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“Petitions Without Number”: Widows’
Petitions and the Early Nineteenth-Century
Origins of Public Marriage-Based Entitlements
KRISTIN A. COLLINS
Introduction
In 1858, Catharine Barr wrote to the Pension Commissioner in Washington,
D.C., seeking reinstatement of her widow’s pension. Barr explained that she
had been married to two men who had died in the service of the United
States: first to George Bundick, “a young and beloved husband” who had
died in the War of 1812; then to William Davidson in 1835, who had
died in 1836 of injuries sustained while serving on the USS Vandalia.1
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1. File of Catharine Davidson, National Archives and Records Administration,
Washington, D.C. (hereinafter NARA), Records of the Department of Veterans Affairs,
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She acknowledged that she was not, strictly speaking, a widow, as her current
husband, James Barr, was still living and they were still married.2 She never-
theless sought reinstatement of the pension she had been granted as
Davidson’s widow. Pursuant to the terms of the relevant pension statute,
Barr’s pension had terminated upon her remarriage to James. However, as
Barr explained to the commissioner, James “has neither been with me or
given me one Dollar for my support since 1849, and I know not his where-
abouts.”3 Having also lost her father in the War of 1812, Barr saw herself as
particularly deserving of the federal government’s assistance and believed
that she and other widows in her position had a claim on the national coffers.
“I for one,” she implored, “have no Dependence on Earth only what comes
through my relations.”4
Catharine Barr was one of tens of thousands of women who, from the
1790s through the onset of the Civil War, sought and received assistance
from the federal government as military widows.5 During a period
known for its paltry and punitive local poor laws, Congress enacted
approximately seventy-six public law statutes granting cash pensions to
large classes of widows of soldiers and veterans who had served in the
United States military.6 Although war widows’ pensions were not
unknown in Anglo-American law, this system of social provision for
C. Whiting, Commissioner of Pensions, June 20, 1858. See also, ibid., Catharine Davidson
to Secretary of the Navy, February 14, 1842. Catharine Barr’s maiden name was Dorgan but
her widow’s pension application is filed under her second husband’s name, William
Davidson, and hence I cite to her pension file using that last name. When referring to
Catharine in the text, however, I refer to her as Barr, as that was her name during her
final and, to my knowledge, longest pursuit of a widow’s pension. When citing to particular
letters in footnotes, I use the name she used to sign the letter, that is, Catharine Davidson or
Catharine Barr.
2. See ibid., Catharine Davidson to Commissioner of Pensions, September 8, 1858.
Although Barr does not reveal as much in her letters to the Pension Office, by 1858 she
had been married at least five times. In addition to her marriages to Bundick, Davidson,
and Barr, records suggest that she married Samie Sniffin in 1818 or thereabouts and
Captain Charles Hobday in 1823. See Application of Harriet M. Buhler for Membership
in the Daughters of the American Revolution, October 15, 1937 (noting Catherine [sic]
Dorgan’s marriage to Samie Sniffen in 1818); “Married,” N.Y. Spectator, April 29, 1823,
at 1 (reporting the marriage of Captain Charles Hobday to Mrs. Catherine [sic] Sniffen).
3. File of Catharine Davidson, NARA, Records of the Department of Veterans Affairs, RG
15, Old Wars Pension Files, Widow’s File 322, Catharine Barr to George C. Whiting,
Commissioner of Pensions, September 8, 1858.
4. Ibid., Catharine Barr to George C. Whiting, Commissioner of Pensions, June 20, 1858.
5. See below note 29.
6. See, for example, statutes cited below in notes 17, 19, 20, 22, and 26. See also Kristin
A. Collins, “Administering Marriage: Marriage-Based Entitlements, Bureaucracy, and the
Legal Construction of the Family,” Vanderbilt Law Review 62 (2009): 1085–167.
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military widows departed from English and colonial precedent in signifi-
cant ways. First, starting in the 1810s, Congress gradually began providing
pensions to widows of rank-and-file soldiers, thus deviating from the class-
salient approach of eighteenth-century widows’ pensions—both English
and American—which had privileged the widows of officers. Second,
and as significant, in the 1830s, Congress began providing service-based
pensions to large classes of widows of veterans, also regardless of rank,
thereby providing a kind of old-age pension for thousands of women
whose husbands had not died in battle. By the 1830s, military widows’
pensions were no longer an entitlement tied to privilege and status, or an
ad hoc form of relief for particularly sympathetic individual widows.
Rather, they were a form of financial assistance, created by public law sta-
tutes, intended to alleviate pinching poverty for a significant class of
women. Catharine Barr’s plea for a pension thus serves as a lens through
which to view an important but often overlooked early nineteenth-century
phenomenon: the development of the first centralized broad-scale system
of public marriage-based entitlements in American law.
Publicly funded marriage-based entitlements are commonplace today,
but they were a novelty in the early nineteenth century. In that era, one
of the primary purposes of marriage was to contain liability for women’s
financial needs within the private family, so as not to open up government
coffers to claims by wives, widows, and other family dependents.7 Given
recent debates concerning the scope and propriety of marriage-based enti-
tlements in American law and policy, scholars have asked surprisingly few
questions about the earliest origins of this form of centralized social pro-
vision.8 Through an investigation of the development of military widows’
7. See Ariela R. Dubler, “In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal
Construction of the Family and the State,” Yale Law Journal 112 (2003): 1658–59.
8. Theda Skocpol’s pathbreaking study of Civil War military pensions illuminated the sig-
nificance of military pensions as a form of social provision, and in particular provision made
for widows and other family dependents. See Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political
Origins of Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1992). However, Skocpol references pre-Civil War veterans’ and widows’ pensions in pas-
sing only, noting that “the expansions of U.S. military pensions prior to the 1860s were
minimal compared to what was to come with the mass-mobilizing Civil War and its political
aftermath.” Ibid., 105. Alice Kessler–Harris’s study of the Social Security Act of 1939 and
related early twentieth-century legislation probes the modern history of social provision for
women predicated on marriage. See In Pursuit of Equity: Women, Men and the Quest for
Economic Citizenship in 20th-Century America (New York: Oxford University Press,
2001). Linda Gordon has focused on the development of mothers’ aid statutes and “welfare”
for mothers from the Progressive period through the New Deal. See Linda Gordon, Pitied
but Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare, 1890–1935 (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1994). However, attention to social provision for women
in the early nineteenth century has largely focused on local poor law legislation and charity,
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pensions in the early nineteenth century, this article takes a fresh look at the
history of social provision for women, marriage-based entitlements, and
women’s experience of the law during this period. Elsewhere, I have
focused on the sizable and complex administrative system that developed
to administer military pensions in the early nineteenth century, and
widows’ navigation of that bureaucracy.9 Here, my concern is the widows’
interaction with Congress and the fundamental but complex question of
causation: Why, in the early nineteenth century, did Congress come to sub-
sidize marriage on a significant scale?
Although the forces leading to the development of a significant and
complex system of military widows’ pensions in the early nineteenth cen-
tury were many, this article focuses on the important role played by
widows’ pension petitions to Congress, both because they were instrumen-
tal in the development of this particular form of entitlement and because
they are an under-examined instance of women’s participation in early
nineteenth-century American legal and political life. In so doing, this
article helps illuminate how marriage-based entitlements became
entrenched in American law and social policy, forming part of our common
sociolegal understanding of what it means to be married.
Women’s petitioning practices of the early nineteenth century have not
escaped the notice of historians. Much of that attention has focused on
women’s overtly reform-oriented petitioning efforts, such as the abolition-
ist petitions that flooded Congress in the 1830s and 1840s, and the petitions
opposing Indian removal of the same period.10 Over the course of the early
nineteenth century, however, hundreds of women engaged in an arguably
more pedestrian mode of petitioning by making formal requests to
Congress for pensions based on their status as military widows. Their stor-
ies, and the role of their petitions in transforming military widows’ pen-
sions from a rarefied, class-salient privilege to a broad-scale entitlement,
are the focus of this article.
rather than centralized, government-funded systems of entitlement. See, for example, Mimi
Abramovitz, Regulating the Lives of Women: Social Welfare Policy from Colonial Times to
the Present (Boston: South End Press, 1989), 181–213.
9. See Collins, “Administering Marriage,” 1122–56.
10. See, for example, Lori D. Ginzberg, Untidy Origins: A Story of Women’s Rights in
Antebellum New York (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005); Alisse
Portnoy, Their Right to Speak: Women’s Activism in the Indian and Slave Debates
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Susan Zaeske, Signatures of
Citizenship: Petitioning, Antislavery, and Women’s Political Identity (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2003); and Mary Hershberger, “Mobilizing Women,
Anticipating Abolition: The Struggle Against Indian Removal in the 1830s,” Journal of
American History 86 (1999): 15–40.
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To explain the petitioning process and the role of widows in shaping
these early marriage-based entitlements, this article first details the experi-
ences of two early nineteenth-century widows, Susan Decatur and
Catharine Barr. Decatur and Barr took very different routes to obtaining
their pensions. Decatur, the widow of the famous commodore Stephen
Decatur, petitioned Congress directly in pursuit of a private act: a law
enacted for the benefit of a named individual. Barr sought pensions pur-
suant to several of the public or general law widows’ pension statutes
that Congress enacted in the early nineteenth century. Standing alone,
the stories of Decatur and Barr provide a window into individual women’s
negotiation of state power in the early nineteenth century—experiences
undoubtedly marked by class and circumstance. But precisely because of
the differences in Barr’s and Decatur’s experiences, their stories also pro-
vide important clues concerning the evolution of military widows’ pen-
sions. By situating these two women’s experiences within the more
general legislative history of the widows’ pension system, we see that an
important force leading to the development of the first centralized system
of marriage-based entitlements was the formal assertion by widows to
Congress that, in certain circumstances, marital status should serve as a
basis for government support.
In making the case for widows’ pensions, widows and their supporters
drew on contemporary notions of domesticity and allied conceptions of
men’s status as citizen-soldiers. In this respect, widows’ petitions provide
a rich example of how women of the early nineteenth century deployed
powerful gender conventions in an effort to achieve particular goals, a
strategy that historians have traced in other late eighteenth- and early
nineteenth-century contexts.11 In the case of widows’ pension petitions,
that discursive strategy helped translate a set of powerful beliefs about
women’s and men’s proper roles and capacities into a legal claim for
federal material support—and not just for the Susan Decaturs of the
world, but for common women like Catharine Barr as well.
11. There is a robust and expanding literature exploring the various ways that women har-
nessed contemporary gender conventions in their efforts to shape government practices and
civil society in the early nineteenth century. See, for example, Rosemarie Zagarri,
Revolutionary Backlash: Women and Politics in the Early American Republic
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007); Elizabeth R. Varon, We Mean to
Be Counted: White Women and Politics in Antebellum Virginia (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1998); Mary P. Ryan, Women in Public: Between Banners and
Ballots, 1825–1880 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 130–41; Linda K.
Kerber, Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 85; and Lori D. Ginzberg, “‘Moral
Suasion Is Moral Balderdash’: Women, Politics, and Social Activism in the 1850s,”
Journal of American History 73 (1986): 601–22.
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Two preliminary remarks are in order. First, this is not a story about
boundless congressional generosity to “worthy widows,” or about the rad-
ical democratization of women’s rights as wives. Many widows’ petitions
for individual relief were, in fact, denied. However, considered collec-
tively, such petitions prompted substantial legislative debate concerning
the scope and basis of the government’s obligation to support widows,
and helped give rise to programmatic support for widows through general
legislation.
Second, it is worth emphasizing that neither widows’ pension petitions,
nor the gender-based ideology on which they frequently drew, did all of the
work. A whole host of factors influenced the development of military
widows’ pensions in crucial ways, including economic and political trends,
broader changes in legislative practice, and an early nineteenth-century cul-
ture of militarism. My goal in focusing on the importance of widows’ peti-
tions is not to diminish the significance of these other factors, but rather to
highlight the particular political and legal process through which women
helped to bring about a significant transformation in government policy,
even (or especially) as they relied on a constellation of gender-based beliefs
that also served to circumscribe women’s claims to full citizenship in other
contexts.12
The petitioning process was itself bound in part by gender-conventional
expectations concerning women’s engagement with the state. But however
humble their discursive conventions, widows’ petitions put women’s finan-
cial needs on the national legislative agenda, brought attention to the
inequity of inherited class-salient practices, and informed the way national
legislators reasoned about women’s claims on, and their position within,
the polity. To overlook widows’ petitions in an analysis of the develop-
ment of military widows’ pensions would result in an anemic account of
the evolution of social provision for women. Drawing on deeply held
beliefs concerning women’s dependency and proper social role, while sim-
ultaneously asserting new claims on the polity, widows’ petitions helped
12. By focusing on widows’ petitions as an important factor in the emergence of military
widows’ pensions, this article builds on and attempts to bridge two analytical approaches
that have tended to dominate discussions of the development of broad-scale systems of social
provision: the institutional-political process approach favored by political scientists (see, for
example, Margaret Wier, Anna Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol, The Politics of Social
Policy in the United States [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988], 40–41), and fem-
inist historians’ keen attention to the role of gender ideology in the evolution of redistributive
systems (see Kessler–Harris, In Pursuit of Equity; Abramovitz, Regulating the Lives of
Women; and Barbara Nelson, “The Origins of the Two-Channel Welfare State:
Workmen’s Compensation and Mothers’ Aid,” in Women, the State, and Welfare, ed.
Linda Gordon [Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990], 123–51).
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initiate a lasting change in American law and policy: the development of
the public marriage-based entitlement.
I. The First System of Public Marriage-Based Entitlements
Today, the death of one’s spouse can trigger all manner of public and pri-
vate compensation for the surviving widow or widower, including Social
Security survivors’ benefits, workers’ compensation, life insurance
benefits, and tort remedies in wrongful-death actions. However, the law
has not always been so focused on the financial security of surviving
spouses. Early nineteenth-century law provided for widows and widowers
through intestacy law and related doctrines such as dower and curtesy, but the
scope of such provision was limited.13 Certainly, the notion that a spouse’s
death could trigger the allocation of public assets was not understood as a
natural consequence of the marital relationship. Under eighteenth-century
Anglo-American law and policy, the vast majority of war widows—
women who would seem to have had the greatest claim on the polity’s
sympathy and resources—went uncompensated for their husbands’ deaths.
The system of federal military widows’ pensions that developed in
America over the course of the early nineteenth century marked an important
departure: the creation of legal entitlements to public monies for a significant
class of women, based on their marriage to a worthy husband.14
Anglo-American governments had provided for some military widows,
but such provision was of a different scope and kind. In eighteenth-century
England, pensioning the widows of officers was a fairly common practice,
but systematic provision for widows of soldiers was not available until the
end of the nineteenth century.15 American colonial governments adopted a
similar class-salient approach to war widows’ pensions, generally provid-
ing significant pensions to the widows of officers as a matter of course,
but providing for the widows of soldiers, if at all, though poor-law types
of statutes that were based on need and limited to subsistence-level sup-
port.16 This pattern persisted on the federal level from the Revolutionary
13. See discussion accompanying notes 159–62.
14. This section draws significantly onmy description of the early nineteenth-centurymilitary
widows’ pension statutes provided in Collins, “Administering Marriage,” 1095–116.
15. See Myna Trustram, Women of the Regiment: Marriage and the Victorian Army
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 92 (“Pensions for officers’ widows and
orphans originated in the early eighteenth century. NCOs and privates had to wait for almost
two centuries before the needs of their families were recognised.”).
16. For examples of colonial poor law provision for families of soldiers, see “An Act for
Relieving Such as Shall Be Maimed in the Colonies Service, and the Widow, Parents or
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era to the first decade of the nineteenth century: in 1780, the Continental
Congress granted pensions to the widows of Revolutionary War officers,
an act that Congress later ratified, and a general practice that Congress con-
tinued through the early 1810s.17
Congress’s first innovation with respect to widows’ pensions expanded
the socioeconomic reach of the pension system as it applied to what one
might call traditional war widows—women whose husbands died in the
line of duty—by making such pensions available regardless of the hus-
band’s rank.18 This equalization of war widows’ pensions was an evol-
utionary rather than a revolutionary process. Two years into the War of
1812, Congress began to provide for traditional war widows of the
Relations of Such as Shall Be Kill’d in the Colonies Service, and Shall Not Be Able to
Subsist or Maintain Themselves” (1718) reprinted in The Earliest Acts and Laws of the
Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations 1647–1719, ed. John D. Cushing
(Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1977), 228–29; and “An Act to Amend the Act
Concerning Pensioners” (1785) in The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of All the
Laws of Virginia, ed. William Waller Hening (Richmond: George Cochran, 1823), 12:105.
17. For examples of acts granting pensions to officers’ widows only, see Journals of the
Continental Congress, 1774–1789, ed. Worthington C. Ford et al. (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1904–37), 17:772–73 (resolution of August 24, 1780 providing
pensions to widows of Revolutionary War officers); Act of June 7, 1794, ch. 52, § 1, 1 Stat.
390, 390 (providing 5-year half-pay pensions to widows of commissioned officers who “die
by reason of wounds received in actual service of the United States”); Act of March 16,
1802, ch. 9, § 15, 2 Stat. 132, 135 (providing 5-year half-pay pensions to widows of “com-
missioned officer[s] in the military peace establishment” who “die by reason of any wound
received in actual service of the United States”); and Act of January 11, 1812, ch. 14, § 15, 2
Stat. 671, 673 (providing 5-year half-pay pensions to widows of “any commissioned officer
in the military establishment of the United States” who died “by reason of any wound
received in actual service of the United States”).
18. Unlike most widows’ service-based pensions, described in the text accompanying
notes 24–26, traditional war widows’ pension statutes also provided for the children of
deceased soldiers and officers, but only in the absence of a widow or upon her death or
remarriage. Children were pension eligible until they reached the age of 16 or 21, or the
term-limited pension expired, whichever occurred first. See, for example, Act of April 10,
1812, ch. 54, § 2, 2 Stat. 704, 704; Act of March 19, 1836, ch. 44, § 5, 5 Stat. 7, 7; and
Act of March 3, 1837, ch. 38, § 1, 5 Stat. 180, 180. Careful analysis of statutory provision
for the children of fallen soldiers is outside the scope of this article. However, a few obser-
vations are particularly relevant to understanding the widows’ pension statutes. First, it is
significant that children were not primary beneficiaries of the pension statutes, given that
under contemporary intestacy law children had a direct claim on their fathers’ estate that
was in certain respects superior to that of the widow. See Collins, “Administering
Marriage,” 1111–12. Second, although traditional war widows’ pensions extended to
orphans in some circumstances and were often justified based on widows’ actual or pre-
sumed service as mothers, motherhood was not required for widows’ pension eligibility––
only marriage. Accordingly, a widows’ pension eligibility turned on the existence of a
legal marriage, a point I explore in detail in “Administering Marriage,” 1130–40.
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rank-and-file; first to widows of privateers and navy seamen, and next to
widows of army soldiers.19 In subsequent years, Congress regularly
enacted general pension statutes for the benefit of widows of seamen
who perished in ongoing naval encounters and widows of soldiers who
died in “frontier wars.”20 Until the 1830s, however, the default rule in sta-
tutes governing the military establishment was to provide pensions to the
war widows of officers only.21
In 1836, Congress enacted two watershed statutes that dramatically
expanded the socioeconomic reach of widows’ pensions. First, in March
of that year, it provided a 5-year pension to the widow of any “officer, non-
commissioned officer, musician, artificer, or private, of volunteer and mili-
tia corps, who shall die in the service of the United States,”22 thus creating
a blanket provision for the war widows of men of all ranks. In so doing,
Congress departed from the class-salient default rule that had tended to
characterize traditional war widows’ pensions in Anglo-American law
for at least 200 years.23
Then, in July of the same year, Congress took the equally significant step
of introducing broad-scale service-based pensions to large classes of
Revolutionary War widows, including widows of soldiers. Widows’
19. Act of March 4, 1814, ch. 20, §§ 1–2, 3 Stat. 103, 103; and Act of April 16, 1816, ch.
55, §§ 1–2, 3 Stat. 285, 285–86.
20. See, for example, Act of March 3, 1817, ch. 60, § 1, 3 Stat. 373, 373–74 (providing
5-year half-pay pensions to widows of navy officers, seamen, and marines who had died, or
were to die, in the line of duty after June 18, 1812); Act of April 20, 1818, ch. 101, § 2, 3
Stat. 459, 459 (granting 5-year half-pay pensions to widows of militia who “prosecut[ed] the
war against the Seminole tribe of Indians”); and Act of May 23, 1828, ch. 72, § 1, 4 Stat.
288, 288 (granting 5-year extension of pensions awarded to widows of all “officers, seamen
and marines” killed in the War of 1812).
21. See sources cited in note 17.
22. Act of March 19, 1836, ch. 44, § 5, 5 Stat. 7 (emphasis added).
23. In English law, there was a brief but important exception to the class-salient approach
to military widows’ pensions in the mid-seventeenth century. Following the English Civil
War, soldiers’ war widows were eligible to receive pensions from a fund established by
the short-lived republican Commonwealth government, as long as the widow could demon-
strate poverty as a result of her husband’s death. See Geoffrey L. Hudson, “Negotiating for
Blood Money: War Widows and the Courts in Seventeenth-Century England,” in Women,
Crime and the Courts in Early Modern England, ed. Jennifer Kermode and Garthine
Walker (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 151–52. Hudson explains,
however, that after the demise of that system with the restoration of the monarchy, widows of
English soldiers would not receive pensions “for over 200 years.” Ibid., 146. Isser Woloch
has excavated another republican experiment with pensions for the widows of soldiers in
France at the end of the eighteenth century. However, France’s experiment with the pension
alimentaire for soldiers’ widows was also short lived, ending in the 1810s. See Isser
Woloch, “War-Widows Pensions: Social Policy in Revolutionary and Napoleonic France,”
Societas 6 (1976): 238–40.
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service-based pension statutes benefited women whose husbands died long
after their military service had concluded, almost always of causes unre-
lated to that service. The Act of July 4, 1836 awarded lifetime pensions
to the widows of “officers, marines, mariners, musicians, and soldiers”
who had served in the Revolutionary War for at least 6 months, “whose
marriage took place before the expiration of [their] last period of service,”
and who had never remarried.24 The women pensioned under this Act were
not the young widows of fallen soldiers who usually come to mind when
we think of war widows. As one committee report explained, “[t]he pro-
visions of the act [of 1836] were clearly intended to sustain the widow
in her declining life.”25 Through several general pension statutes enacted
between 1837 and 1853, Congress expanded the categories of widows eli-
gible for service-based pensions, thus promising cash assistance to the
many thousands of women who had been married to a Revolutionary
War veteran at some point in their lives.26
These two significant shifts—the leveling of traditional war widows’
pensions and the creation of service-based widows’ pensions for
Revolutionary War widows—spawned a significant system of centralized
public marriage-based entitlements. This system was not completely free
of the rank-based obsession of the military, as the amount awarded to
24. See Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 362, § 3, 5 Stat. 127, 128. Section 3 of the July 4, 1836
statute extended the Revolutionary War veterans’ service-based pensions, created in 1832, to
veterans’ widows. See Act of June 7, 1832, ch. 126, § 1, 4 Stat. 529, 529–30. Pursuant to
Section 3, the widow received the same amount that her husband had received under the
1832 Act. Thus, widows whose husbands had served in the Revolutionary War for at
least 2 years received full pay for life (capped at the pay of a captain) and widows whose
husbands had served between 6 months and 2 years received pensions prorated based on
their length of service. See Act of July 4, 1836, § 3; and Act of June 7, 1832, § 1.
25. Committee on Revolutionary Pensions, Huldah Pennyman, H.R. Rep. No. 24–235, 1
(1837).
26. See, for example, Act of March 3, 1837, ch. 42, § 2, 5 Stat. 187, 187 (granting lifetime
pensions to widows who had married a Revolutionary War veteran prior to 1783); Act of
July 7, 1838, ch. 189, § 1, 5 Stat. 303, 303 (granting 5-year pensions to widows who had
married a Revolutionary War veteran prior to 1794); Act of March 3, 1843, ch. 102, § 1,
5 Stat. 647, 647 (granting a 1-year extension of pensions awarded to widows pursuant to
the Act of July 7, 1838); Act of June 17, 1844, ch. 102, §§ 1–2, 5 Stat. 680, 680 (granting
a 4-year extension of pensions awarded to widows pursuant to the Act of July 7, 1838); Act
of February 2, 1848, ch. 8, §§ 1–2, 9 Stat. 210, 210–11 (transforming widows’ pensions
awarded under the Act of July 7, 1838 into lifetime pensions); Act of July 29, 1848, ch.
120, § 1, 9 Stat. 265, 265–66 (granting lifetime pensions to Revolutionary War widows mar-
ried prior to 1800); and Act of February 3, 1853, ch. 41, § 2, 10 Stat. 154, 154 (granting
lifetime pensions to Revolutionary War widows, regardless of when their marriage to a
veteran took place).
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individual widows was calibrated largely to the husband’s rank.27 And it
would be a serious overstatement to characterize this complicated constel-
lation of widows’ pension statutes as a system of universal entitlements.
They were part of the advent of an enduring form of provision in
American social policy: the selective entitlement.28 Nevertheless, these
statutes created a far-reaching program of social provision that benefited
tens of thousands of women. Based on early nineteenth-century records
collected by the Pension Office and submitted to Congress, between
1836 and the outbreak of the Civil War, more than 47,000 widows collected
pensions under federal pension laws.29
27. The amount an individual widow received as a pension corresponded to her husband’s
rank because her pension was calculated according to the soldier’s or officer’s pay, although
pensions were generally capped at a particular rank, such as captain or lieutenant colonel.
See, for example, Act of June 7, 1794, ch. 52, § 1, 1 Stat. 390, 390; Act of April 10,
1812, ch. 54, § 2, 2 Stat. 704, 705; Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 362, § 3, 5 Stat. 127, 128;
and Act of February 3, 1853, ch. 41, § 1, 10 Stat. 154, 154.
28. Laura Jensen makes this important point with respect to veterans’ service-based pen-
sions, which Congress expanded significantly in the 1810s and 1820s. See Laura Jensen,
Patriots, Settlers, and the Origins of American Social Policy (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), 9–12.
29. My estimate that at least 47,000 widows collected pensions from 1836 to 1860
exceeds estimates offered by William Glasson and John Resch, both of whom placed the
number at approximately 23,000. See William H. Glasson, Federal Military Pensions in
the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1918), 95–96; and John Resch,
Suffering Soldiers: Revolutionary War Veterans, Moral Sentiment, and Political Culture
in the Early Republic (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999), 203. In large
part, this is because Glasson and Resch included only Revolutionary War widows in their
estimates, whereas my calculation includes traditional war widows who received pensions
between 1836 and 1861. Accordingly, there is no actual inconsistency between my estimates
and theirs, although the lower estimates are misleading if they are understood to represent the
full scope of early nineteenth-century military widows’ pensions. My calculation is based on
careful examination of data contained in early nineteenth-century reports by the
Commissioner of Pensions to Congress. The vagaries of early nineteenth-century record keep-
ing make any estimation imperfect, and when in doubt I erred on the side of undercounting the
number of widows receiving pensions. See Loren Pinckney Waldo, Report of the
Commissioner of Pensions, H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 33–1, 1:488, 495 (1st Sess. 1853); Loren
Pinckney Waldo, Report of the Commissioner of Pensions, S. Exec. Doc. No. 33–1, 1:558–
59 (2nd Sess. 1854); J. Minot, Report of the Commissioner of Pensions, H.R. Exec. Doc.
No. 34–1, 1:594 (1st Sess. 1855); J. Minot, Report of the Commissioner of Pensions, H.R.
Exec. Doc. No. 34–1, 1:848 (3rd Sess. 1856); George C. Whiting, Report of the
Commissioner of Pensions, H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 35–2, 2:706–9 (1st Sess. 1857); George
C. Whiting, Report of the Commissioner of Pensions, H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 35–2, 2:676–79
(2nd Sess. 1858); George C. Whiting, Report of the Commissioner of Pensions, S. Exec.
Doc. No. 36–2, 1:825–28 (1st Sess. 1859); and George C. Whiting, Report of the
Commissioner of Pensions, S. Exec. Doc. No. 36–1, 1:470–73 (2nd Sess. 1860).
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Of course, numbers do not tell the entire story. Widows’ military pen-
sion statutes not only created new entitlements for a significant group of
women, but also reflected and disseminated important social knowledge
about women’s legal rights as wives. As I have examined elsewhere, fed-
eral military widows’ pensions of this period were supported and
implemented by a significant administrative apparatus that reached from
the Pension Office of the War Department in Washington, D.C., to individ-
ual local banks that issued payments on widows’ pension certificates.30
The enactment of public law pension statutes thus ushered large numbers
of widows into the federal administrative system that evolved to determine
individuals’ pension eligibility, an experience that undoubtedly shaped
those women’s understanding of their status in the polity as wives and
widows. Widows’ pension applications reveal the unsurprising but impor-
tant fact that military widows were aware of the pensions awarded to other
widows, and that they talked to each other—in town, in church, at the mar-
ket—about the pension laws and the availability of pensions for different
categories of widows.31 These new statutory rights for widows were routi-
nely and prominently reported in newspapers around the country, creating
a direct connection between the federal government and individual women,
between Washington and scattered localities, between nation and neighbor-
hood.32 Pension claims agents—a class of middlemen who, for a fee,
assisted both widows and veterans with their military pension appli-
cations—disseminated information about widows’ new statutory rights
while peddling their services.33 Widows of soldiers and veterans thus
30. For a detailed discussion of the administration of the widows’ pensions, see Collins,
“Administering Marriage,” 1123–40.
31. See, for example, Committee on Revolutionary Claims, Heir of Richard Wilde, H.R.
Rep. 27–357 (1842) (petition reports that the “widow of Lieutenant Wilde had often applied
to her friends to get her an allowance for her husband’s services, and was always told by
them that they knew of no law that would entitle her to receive anything”); Committee on
Military Affairs, Pamela Adams, H.R. Rep. 23–328, 2 (1834) (widow’s petition notes that
she is seeking a pension “by the advice of friends”). See also text accompanying notes 97
and 128–40.
32. See, for example, “War Department, Pension Office,” Berkshire Journal,May 5, 1831, at
1 (reporting widows’ right to arrears under the Act of March 2, 1829, setting forth application
procedures, and noting that “printers in the city and country are requested to insert the above
for the benefit of revolutionary pensioners”); “Pensions to Widows,” Salem Gazette, March
21, 1837, at 2 (reporting that Congress had granted pensions to widows of those who had
died in the navy, “whatever was the cause of death, whether they were seamen or marines”);
“Information to the Widows and Children of the Revolution, and of Such as Died in the War
of 1812,” Farmers’ Cabinet, December 6, 1839, at 3 (providing basic information regarding
widows’ pension eligibility under extant acts of Congress).
33. For example, in a declaration submitted to the Pension Office in 1847, Pamela
Blackwell of New Jersey explained that “she knew well that she was entitled to a pension
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became a community of women—both real and “imagined”—who, by vir-
tue of their former marriage to a soldier or veteran, had been deemed
worthy recipients of government assistance.34 The widows’ pensions ident-
ified marriage as a common condition of women’s status in, and claims on,
the national polity.
The blossoming of the widows’ pension system also marked a signifi-
cant shift in marriage’s sociolegal significance, from recognition of
widows’ claims on society’s benevolence to recognition of widows’
legal claims on the polity. Congress’s rejection of the petition of one
Ruth Roberts in 1790 betrays a prevalent late eighteenth-century attitude
toward widows’ pensions. During the Revolutionary War, Roberts’s hus-
band had suffered serious injuries that prevented him from working his
farm and ultimately led to his death. In a report recommending that
Congress reject Roberts’s pension petition, Secretary of War Knox advised
that “although the situation of the petitioner may entitle her to the assistance
of all humane persons, yet the circumstances of the case do not appear to be
such as to constrain the United States to depart from the principles, practice
[s], and limitations established by the late Congress.”35 Those principles,
practices, and limitations did not provide for widows like Ruth Roberts, at
least not in 1790.
By 1854, however, pension treatise writers Robert Mayo and Ferdinand
Moulton could announce that “widows and orphans, being the natural and
civil dependents of their husbands and fathers whilst living, might there-
fore be considered as justly entitled to the continuance, nay the inheritance,
of the right, virtually as a vested right, of [a] pension, at the death of their
said natural and civil protectors.”36 It had taken national legislators sev-
eral decades to reach the conclusion that marriage could give large
from the Government soon after the passage of that law”––the Act of July 4, 1836––as “she
was visited by a number of agents to draw papers and prosecute her claim.” File of Pamela
Blackwell, NARA, RG 15, microfilmed on Records of the Veterans’ Administration,
Revolutionary War Pension and Bounty Land Application Files, 1800–1900 (1974),
Series M804 (hereinafter “Series M804”), W 839, Declaration of Pamela Blackwell,
April 5, 1847. For a detailed discussion of the pension claims agents and their function in
the pension claims process, see Collins, “Administering Marriage,” 1124–27.
34. The phrase “imagined community” is, of course, Benedict Anderson’s, and it refers to
the power of various mechanisms––including newspapers––to build a sense of nationalism
in the absence of direct contact between members of a national polity. Benedict Anderson,
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York:
Verso, 1983).
35. Report of Secretary of War Knox to Congress on the Claim of Ruth Roberts, February 5,
1790, American State Papers: Claims, 1:5–6.
36. See Robert Mayo and Ferdinand Moulton, Army and Navy Pension Laws, and Bounty
Land Laws of the United States, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Lucas Brothers, 1854), XXVI–XXVII.
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classes of women claims on the public treasure, and to enact and
implement a body of laws and administrative processes that facilitated
this understanding.
II. The Expansion and Leveling of Widows’ Pensions
Why did Congress get into the business of providing military widows’ pen-
sions to such a broad cross-section of women? In particular, why the shift
from a limited and relatively inexpensive pension system that privileged
the widows of officers to one in which tens of thousands of women became
entitled to military pensions on the basis of their marriage to a man who
had died during his service, or simply served, in the military? Of course,
there is no single explanation for such a complex phenomenon. But any
answer must be sensitive to political and legal strategies open to women,
and to women’s very limited formal agency at the time, while also account-
ing for contemporary changes, pronounced and subtle, in the ideological
valences of family and gender. Widows’ pension petitions have received
little sustained attention, but they are an obvious and important source of
evidence of how the financial needs of large classes of widows became
a politically legitimate, and at times pressing, subject of federal legislation.
The widows’ pension petitions are in many respects a study in the repro-
duction of gender-conventional norms in public law. As discussed in
greater detail below, widows’ petitions relied upon, and reinforced, the
centrality of men’s and women’s traditional gendered roles: men’s service
as citizen-soldiers and women’s service as wives and mothers; men’s status
as heads of household and women’s dependency within the household. It
would be a mistake, however, to understand widows’ pension petitions, or
the pensions themselves, as wholly conventional in their ambitions and
influence. Wives had long been considered their husbands’ dependents
under the law, and husbands their wives’ protectors and providers.
However, before the early nineteenth century, such private dependency
had not translated into public support for the vast majority of military
widows, even when their husbands died in service to country. The expan-
sion of widows’ pensions thus signaled a growing consciousness of wives’
domestic responsibilities and dependent status as matters of public, and
even national, significance that could, under certain circumstances, justify
public material support for widows across the socioeconomic spectrum.37
37. For two foundational examinations of the development of the concept of domesticity
in the early nineteenth century, see Nancy F. Cott, The Bonds of Womanhood: “Women’s
Sphere” in New England, 1780–1835 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); and
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To help understand this shift in the provision of military widows’ pen-
sions, and the role of widows’ petitions in bringing about this shift, it is
useful to compare the experiences of two widows, Susan Decatur and
Catharine Barr. Decatur’s saga is a story of Old World mores and the
patronage politics of Washington, D.C. The experience of Decatur, a
woman of extraordinary wealth and political connections, simultaneously
sheds light on the significant role of petitioning and reveals Congress’s
increased skepticism of the hierarchical, class-salient widows’ pensions
that typified both English and colonial pension laws of the eighteenth cen-
tury. Catharine Barr, on the other hand, was a woman of little means or
apparent influence. Her navigation of the pension system and success
(albeit mixed) in obtaining a pension demonstrate the equalization and
expansion of the widows’ pension system, and the concomitant entrench-
ment of marriage as a privileged, public institution deep into the ranks
of society.38
Neither Decatur nor Barr represents the thousands of widows
who sought military pensions during the early nineteenth century.
Nevertheless, their stories illustrate how women’s assertions of formal
claims on the federal government helped give rise to a broad-scale system
of social provision for widows, shaping—sometimes in unintended ways—
women’s rights, women’s legal consciousness, and, ultimately, women’s
relationship to the polity.
A. Susan Decatur
In 1806, Susan Wheeler married the young naval hero Stephen Decatur.
Although she came from a prominent Norfolk family, her marriage to
Stephen catapulted her into the most rarefied social and political circles
of the period. When the couple met, Stephen was already well known
for his first widely celebrated act of heroism: during the Barbary Wars,
he had led a successful mission to destroy a captured American vessel,
the USS Philadelphia.39 This feat earned Stephen, then 25 years of age,
worldwide fame, including the attention of Lord Admiral Nelson, who is
Kathryn Kish Sklar, Catharine Beecher: A Study in American Domesticity (New York:
Norton, 1973).
38. This point draws on Nancy Cott’s important observation that the Civil War widows’
pension system, “reaching far into the ranks of the very poor . . . , reinforced the standard that
the husband and father was the provider and family members his dependents.” See Nancy F.
Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2000), 103.
39. James Tertius de Kay, A Rage for Glory: The Life of Commodore Stephen Decatur,
USN (New York: Free Press, 2004), 45–60.
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said to have commented that it was “the most bold and daring act of the
age.”40 In addition to the honors and medals, Stephen accumulated another
kind of reward in his 10 years of active naval service: prize money.41 In
1818, just after he was appointed navy commissioner, the socially and pol-
itically ambitious couple built a mansion on President’s Park, near the
White House, thereby taking their place among the Washington elite.42
Theirs was a society of Old World tradition, including—especially
among its military members—the honor-bound tradition of dueling.43 In
1820, James Barron challenged Stephen to a duel in response to allegedly
slanderous remarks he had made concerning Barron’s activities during the
Chesapeake–Leopard Affair. As an officer and a gentleman, Stephen had
little choice but to accept Barron’s challenge.44 Legend has it that
Stephen was perhaps too much a gentleman and, at the critical moment,
intentionally aimed low, only slightly wounding Barron. Barron shot to
kill. Stephen’s honor was preserved, but his life was not. It is testimony
to his status as a national hero that President Monroe, the Supreme
Court Justices, and most of Congress attended his funeral.45
At the moment that she had assumed the role of grand hostess in the
nation’s capital, Susan Decatur was left a widow. The couple was childless,
and under Stephen’s will she inherited his entire fortune, including
$75,000, the mansion on President’s Park, and sundry other properties.46
However, within 5 years profligate spending and mismanagement of her
fortune left Decatur in what she considered to be dire straits.47 She did
not qualify for a pension under a general pension statute because
40. Ibid., 59.
41. For a detailed and illuminating discussion of the prize-money system and its dissol-
ution in the nineteenth century, see Nicholas Parillo, “The De-privatization of American
Warfare: How the U.S. Government Used, Regulated, and Ultimately Abandoned
Privateering in the Nineteenth Century,” Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 19
(2007): 23–26.
42. de Kay, A Rage for Glory, 174. For a discussion of elite Washington society during
this period, and especially the role of women in patronage politics, see Catherine Allgor,
Parlor Politics: In Which the Ladies of Washington Help Build a City and a Government
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2000), 128–46.
43. For a discussion of the code of honor that governed dueling in early nineteenth-
century America, see Alison L. LaCroix, “To Gain the Whole World and Lose His Own
Soul: Nineteenth-Century American Dueling as Public Law and Private Code,” Hofstra
Law Review 33 (2004): 501–69.
44. de Kay, A Rage for Glory, 177–92.
45. Charles Lee Lewis, The Romantic Decatur (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1937), 232–33.
46. Ibid., 279 nn.103,105.
47. Ibid., 279 n.105.
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Stephen had not died “by reason of a wound received in the line of his
duty,” as the contemporary pension laws typically required.48 Hence, in
1825, Decatur did what any sensible widow of a famous navy officer
steeped in the capital city’s distinctive culture of society and patronage
would do: she petitioned Congress for support.
Decatur’s initial petition was not styled as a pension bill. Rather, she
asserted a claim for substantial prize money “in behalf of herself and of
the officers and crew” allegedly owed to Stephen and the other men
involved in the destruction of the USS Philadelphia in 1804.49 Although
her petition did not deign to propose a dollar amount for the prize
money owed, her advocates in the House of Representatives did:
$100,000, a princely sum.50 Because Stephen commanded that particular
mission, Decatur stood to collect at least $15,000.51 Decatur’s claim lan-
guished for over a decade, during which time she indeed became near pen-
niless, at least by the standards of the American gentry. Between 1825 and
1836, Decatur renewed or resubmitted her petition to Congress several
times,52 resulting in a raft of committee reports and numerous prolonged
floor debates.53 In 1836, she was forced to sell the President’s Park
48. See, e.g., Act of March 4, 1814, ch. 20, § 2, 2 Stat. 103 (granting pensions to widows
whose husbands “shall die . . . by reason of a wound received in the line of his duty”). See
also Susan Decatur, H.R. Rep. No. 34–306 (1856) (reprinting J. Minot, Pension
Commissioner, to Hon. S.R. Mallory, Chairman, Senate Committee on Naval Affairs,
May 14, 1856); see source cited in note 214.
49. Committee on Naval Affairs, On the Claim of Mrs. Susan Decatur, Widow of
Commodore Stephen Decatur for Prize Money, for the Capture and Destruction of the
Frigate Philadelphia, at Algiers, H.R. Rep. No. 19–281, at 484–86 (1826).
50. Committee on Naval Affairs, Destruction of Frigate Philadelphia, H.R. Rep. No. 19–
74, at 10 (1827).
51. See ibid.; Committee on Naval Affairs, On the Claims of the Survivors and Legal
Representatives of the Officers and Crew of the Ketch Intrepid, Commanded by Captain
Stephen Decatur, and others, for Remuneration for the Destruction of the Frigate
Philadelphia at Tripoli, in 1804; and Recommending the Distribution of $100,000
Amongst Them in the Proportion Stated, H.R. Rep. No. 24–595 (1836).
52. See Digested Summary and Alphabetical List of Private Claims Presented to the
House of Representatives from the 1st to the 31st Congress (Washington, DC:
Wm. M. Belt, 1853).
53. See, for example, Committee on Naval Affairs, Destruction of Frigate Philadelphia, H.
R. Rep. No. 19–74 (1827); Committee on Naval Affairs, On Senate Bill No. 50––Susan
Decatur, et al., H.R. Rep. No. 20–201 (1828); Case of Susan Decatur, et al., H.R. Rep.
No. 21–60 (1830); On Claim of Mrs. Susan Decatur and Others, H.R. Rep. No. 21–398
(1830); Case of Susan Decatur, et al., H.R. Doc. No. 22–27 (1831); Committee on Naval
Affairs, Susan Decatur, H.R. Rep. No. 23–45 (1833); Committee on Naval Affairs, On
the Claim of Susan Decatur and Others, H.R. Rep. 23–522 (1833); Committee on Naval
Affairs, On the Claims of the Survivors and Legal Representatives of the Officers and
Crew of the Ketch Intrepid, H.R. Rep. No. 24–595 (1836); Committee on Naval Affairs,
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mansion for $12,000 to pay off her creditors,54 but in 1837 her friends in
Congress finally prevailed, securing enough votes for a private act for her
relief.55 The resulting joint resolution was fashioned as a pension in the
amount of $600 per year for 5 years and arrearages of nearly $14,000,
to be administered by the secretary of the treasury as trustee.56
One might think that, after 11 years of her seeking relief from Congress,
the financial security Decatur had achieved by obtaining a private pension
would bring closure to her pursuit. On the same day that Congress passed
the joint resolution for Decatur, however, it also enacted a general pension
law granting a lifetime pension to every widow of “any officer, seaman, or
marine” who died while “in the naval service.”57 In theory, Decatur was
also eligible for a pension and substantial arrearages under this unusually
broadly worded widows’ pension statute which, unlike most traditional war
widows’ pension statutes, was not restricted to widows whose husbands
had died of injuries received in battle.58 Never one to shy from asserting
her rights, Decatur claimed her private pension from the secretary of
the treasury and also applied to the secretary of the navy for a pension
under the general law.59
Decatur’s dual applications presented a serious legal quandary. It was
true that, at least by the letter of the law, Decatur was entitled to pensions
under both the private and public acts. But Secretary of the Navy Mahlon
Dickerson would not tolerate double dipping. After seeking the formal
Susan Decatur, H.R. Rep. 34–22 (1856); and Committee on Naval Affairs, Susan Decatur,
S. Rep. 34–306 (1856). For representative floor debates, see text accompanying notes
206–210.
54. Harold Donaldson Eberlein & Cortland Van Dyke Hubbard, Historic Houses of
George-Town & Washington City (Richmond: Dietz Press, 1958), 271.
55. If personal letters sent to Susan Decatur by representatives and senators are to be taken at
face value, she had many supporters in Congress. See, for example, File of Susan Decatur,
Georgetown University Archives, Box 1, Folder 23, Representative Samuel Carson to Susan
Decatur, February 8, 1832; ibid., Box 1, Folder 24, Representative Edward Everett to
Susan Decatur, February 26, 1832; ibid., Box 1, Folder 30, Representative John Patton to
Susan Decatur, February 5, 1835; ibid., Box 1, Folder 28, Representative George McDuffie
to Susan Decatur, February 7, 1835; and ibid., Box 1, Folder 20, Representative Henry
Horn to Susan Decatur, December 31, 1851. Lewis Cass, secretary of war from 1831 to
1836, was also supportive of her claim. See ibid., Box 1, Folder 21, Lewis Cass to Susan
Decatur, January 2, 1832.
56. A Resolution Granting a Pension to Susan Decatur, Widow of the Late Stephen
Decatur, No. 2, 24th Cong., 2nd Sess. (March 3, 1837); and Cong. Globe, 34th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1600 (1856).
57. Act of March 3, 1837, ch. 38, § 1, 5 Stat. 180.
58. The unusually broad reach of the statute was noted in congressional debates leading to
its repeal, as discussed in text accompanying notes 214–18.
59. Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. 497, 514 (1840).
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opinion of the attorney general, Dickerson wrote to Decatur personally,
informing her that she could choose to collect under the public act or
the private act, but not both.60 Under protest, and “without . . . waiving
her claim to the latter,” Decatur chose to receive a pension under the public
act, which provided generous arrearages and also carried an annual pension
of $600 for life (rather than 5 years).61
But Decatur did not relent. Hopeful that the appointment of her hus-
band’s friend James K. Paulding as secretary of the navy would increase
her chances, Decatur renewed her claim under the private act in 1838.
Paulding denied her claim.62 Decatur responded with an aggressive and
very unusual course: she sued in federal court, seeking a writ of mandamus
“to be directed to the said James K. Paulding, Secretary of the Navy of the
United States, commanding him, that he shall fully comply with, obey, and
execute, the aforesaid resolution of Congress, of the 3d of March, 1837, by
paying your petitioner . . . the full and entire amount of the aforesaid sum
or sums of money, with interest thereon,” which, according to her calcu-
lation, totaled $18,597.63 Decatur’s efforts in federal court were also fruit-
less. In an opinion by Chief Justice Roger Taney, the Supreme Court found
that the duties imposed on the secretary of the navy by congressional acts
such as the one that awarded Decatur a private pension were “not mere
ministerial duties” but “executive duties.”64 The “interference of the
Courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the executive depart-
ments of the government,” Taney reasoned, “would be productive of noth-
ing but mischief.”65
For Decatur, such interference with the “duties of the executive depart-
ments” would produce substantial income, not mischief. She continued to
60. Transcript of Record in Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. 497 (1840), B. F. Butler to Hon.
Mahlon Dickerson, April 11, 1837; and ibid., M. Dickerson to Susan Decatur, April 14,
1837.
61. Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 1600 (1856).
62. Decatur, 39 U.S. 498. Paulding had known Stephen Decatur in the 1810s, when they
had lived in the same Washington, D.C., boardinghouse. See Ralph M. Aderman and Wayne
R. Kime, Advocate for America: The Life of James Kirke Paulding (Selinsgrove, PA:
Susquehanna University Press, 2003), 60–61. Paulding, who was a significant literary
voice for the Democratic party, also wrote a “Biography of Commodore Decatur,” which
was published in Analectic Magazine in 1813. Ibid., 349 n.11.
63. Transcript of Record in Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. 497 (1840), Petition to Circuit
Court (November 25, 1839), 6; and ibid., Amended Petition (December 14, 1839), 15.
64. Decatur, 39 U.S. 515. For a discussion of the Decatur case and its significance for
early nineteenth-century administrative law, see Jerry L. Mashaw, “Administration and
‘The Democracy’: Administrative Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 1829–1861,” Yale Law
Journal 117 (2008): 1673–76.
65. Decatur, 39 U.S. 516.
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seek payment of the private pension by petitioning Congress. Her efforts to
secure the private pension must have become even more urgent when, in
1841, Congress took the exceptional step of repealing the general pension
law enacted on March 3, 1837 — the law that Decatur had elected as the
basis of her pension when she was given the choice by Secretary
Dickerson.66 Congress repealed that general law for reasons only indirectly
related to Decatur’s case, but the repeal left Decatur pensionless and, if her
champions in Congress were to be believed, relatively penniless.67 In 1856,
after a failed effort to pursue her case in the newly created Court of Claims
and several resubmissions of her petition to Congress, Decatur finally con-
vinced the legislators to reinstate her private pension, but without the sub-
stantial arrearages she sought.68 She died 4 years later.
B. Catharine Barr
Catharine Barr was a contemporary of Susan Decatur and she also pursued
a pension from the federal government for much of her adult life.69 Beyond
this similarity, however, Barr and Decatur had little in common. If
Decatur’s story resonates with aristocratic sensibilities and entitlements,
Barr’s story illustrates the new world order of military widows’ pensions:
a broad-scale, relatively equalized system of social provision for widows
66. Act of August 16, 1841, ch. 8, § 1, 5 Stat. 440, 440 (1841).
67. On occasion, Decatur, or at least her supporters in Congress, claimed poverty. See Cong.
Globe, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 1582, 1600 (1856). Others found this assertion implausible given
that Decatur had received arrearages of approximately $14,000 under the March, 3, 1837 public
law before it was repealed. Ibid., 1600. The repeal of the March 3, 1837 general pension law is
discussed in detail in section III.C.
68. Joint Resolution for the Benefit of Susan Decatur, Widow of Commodore Stephen
Decatur, Late of the United States Navy, S.R. 24, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. (August 2, 1856);
and Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2227 (1856).
69. Starting in 1837, Catharine Barr also pursued a pension for herself and her siblings
based on the military service of their father, Andrew Dorgan. Under most traditional war
widows’ pension statutes, if the widow died or remarried, the pension would go to the chil-
dren of the deceased officer, soldier, or seaman, until the children reached the age of 16 or, in
the case of some navy pensions, 21. See, for example, Act of April 10, 1812, ch. 54, §2, 2
Stat. 704, 704; Act of March 3, 1837, ch. 38, § 1, 5 Stat. 180, 180. In 1837 the children of
Andrew Dorgan were awarded pensions for the death of their father in 1817. Although Barr
was the primary advocate for the pension, she collected only a one-time payment of $8.57
because she had turned 21 years of age 3 months after her father died, whereas her youngest
sibling collected a handsome payment of $1,466.71. See File of Andrew Dorgan, NARA,
Records Department of Veterans’ Affairs, RG 15, Old Wars Pension Files, File No. 373,
Andrew Dorgan Sailing Master, Dec’d 20 July 1817 (table calculating pensions due children
of Andrew Dorgan); and File of Catharine Davidson, NARA, Records of the Department of
Veterans’ Affairs, RG 15, Old Wars Pension Files, Widow’s File 322, Catharine Barr to
Secretary of the Navy, February 14, 1842.
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intended primarily as a form of financial support for widows in need, rather
than a status-based reward. Barr’s experience navigating the pension sys-
tem was far more typical of the experiences of the thousands of women
who sought pensions during this period. Perhaps most significant, her pri-
mary (and perhaps only) mode of seeking a pension was not by direct peti-
tion to Congress, but by way of an administrative claim filed with pension
administrators in Washington, D.C.: low-level bureaucrats in the War
Department Pension Office who processed thousands of widows’ claims
every year.70 But Barr’s claim was exceptional in one regard: Barr was
fully literate, and though she had occasional help, it appears that she rep-
resented herself in most of her efforts to secure a pension.71 Barr’s letters to
various administrators therefore provide a fragmented but nevertheless
first-person account of her navigation of the federal pension system, and
of her personal understanding of widows’ pensions and their meaning
for women.
Barr was born in 1796 and from her correspondence we learn that she
married her “young and Beloved husband” George Bundick when she
was 16 or 17 years of age.72 From that point forward, however, Barr
explained in an 1842 letter to pension administrators, “my prospects in
life have been Overcast.”73 Bundick was killed in 1814 “in an engagement
between an English Brig and the Privateer Schooner Surprise of
Baltimore.”74 After his death, and thanks to a series of statutes that
made pensions available to War of 1812 widows regardless of their hus-
bands’ rank, Barr “received a small [annual] pension of 72-Dollars for
five years or as long as I remained his widow.”75 By the time Barr was
18 years old, she was a pensioned widow.
70. For a detailed description of this administrative process, see Collins, “Administering
Marriage,” 1123–46.
71. The vast majority of widows and veterans were represented by pension claims agents,
who took a percentage of the pension as payment for their services. Ibid., 1124–26.
72. File of Catharine Davidson, NARA, Records of the Department of Veterans Affairs,
RG 15, Old Wars Pension Files, Widow’s File 322, Catharine Barr to Commissioner of
Pensions, June 20, 1858; and File of Andrew Dorgan, NARA, Records Department of
Veterans’ Affairs, RG 15, Old Wars Pension Files, File No. 373, Andrew Dorgan Sailing
Master, Dec’d 20 July 1817 (recording Catharine Dorgan’s date of birth as October 20,
1796).
73. File of Catharine Davidson, NARA, Records of the Department of Veterans’ Affairs,
RG 15, Old Wars Pension Files, Widow’s File 322, Catharine Barr to Secretary of the Navy,
February 14, 1842.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid. Barr was almost certainly pensioned under the Act of March 4, 1814, which pro-
vided for the widows of “any officer, seaman or marine serving on board of any private
armed ship or vessel bearing a commission” of the United States. Act of March 4, 1814,
ch. 20, § 1, 3 Stat. 103, 103.
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At this point, there is a significant gap in Barr’s account to the pension
administrators. She does not tell them how long she collected the pension
she received as Bundick’s widow, but other records suggest that she mar-
ried again in 1818,76 an act that would have terminated her pension, if it
had not already expired. Most widows’ pensions terminated if and when
the widow remarried, under the presumption that the widow would be sup-
ported by her husband, and hence no longer needed government assist-
ance.77 But Barr’s experience demonstrates that, for women, the material
security provided by marriage was both contingent and uncertain. By
1823, she appears to have been widowed again, but she was remarried
in April of that year to Captain Charles Hobday.78 Widowed again and
almost 39 years old, in 1835 Barr married a navy quartermaster, William
Davidson.79 Within 1 year of their marriage, Davidson died in a navy hos-
pital of a “profuse hemorrhage from the lungs” that had developed during
one of his voyages.80 In 1836, Barr explained in a letter to the secretary of
the navy that Davidson’s death “cut me of the little Dependance I had and
my health will not allow me to work very hard to support my self.”81 More
important for her pension eligibility, there was no doubt that Davidson had
died “in the publick service,” and hence that his widow was eligible under
76. See Application of Harriet M. Buhler for Membership in the Daughters of the
American Revolution, Oct 15, 1937 (listing Catherine [sic] Dorgan’s marriage to Samie
Sniffen in 1818). Buhler’s account is consistent with a contemporary record of
Catharine’s subsequent marriage to Charles Hobday in 1823. See “Married,” N.Y.
Spectator, April 29, 1823, 1 (reporting the marriage of Captain Charles Hobday to Mrs.
Catherine [sic] Sniffen).
77. See, e.g., Act of March 4, 1814, ch. 20, § 1, 3 Stat. 103, 103 (“in the case of death or
intermarriage of such widow before the expiration of the term of five years” the remaining
pension payments “shall go to the child or children of the deceased” and “shall cease on the
death of such child or children”); and Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 134, 4 Stat. 714, 714 (“every
pension hereby granted shall cease on the death or marriage of such widow”). Congress
sometimes made exceptions to this rule by allowing some re-widowed widows to claim pen-
sions. See discussion in note 182.
78. See “Married,” N.Y. Spectator, April 29, 1823, 1 (reporting the marriage of Captain
Charles Hobday to Mrs. Catherine [sic] Sniffen).
79. See File of Catharine Davidson, NARA, Records of the Department of Veterans
Affairs, RG 15, Old Wars Pension Files, Widow’s File 322, Marriage Certificate of
William and Catharine Davidson, October 15, 1835. Although it is unclear when Charles
Hobday died, an 1829 New York City directory lists Catharine Hobday as a widow. See
Longworth’s American Almanac, New York Register, and City Directory for the
Fifty-fourth Year of American Independence (New York: Thomas Longworth, 1829), 293.
80. File of Catharine Davidson, NARA, Records of the Department of Veterans Affairs,
RG 15, Old Wars Pension Files, Widow’s File 322, Thomas Williamson to Catharine
Davidson, August 14, 1836. Williamson, a hospital administrator, added that Davidson
was an “old sailor, of depraved constitution, & has been a hard drinker.” Ibid.
81. Ibid., Catharine Davidson to Secretary of the Navy, August 22, 1836.
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an existing general pension statute.82 Pursuant to the Act of June 30, 1834,
Barr collected an annual pension of $72 following Davidson’s death. In
March 1837, the 1834 Act was replaced by another general pension statute:
an act that awarded navy widows a lifetime pension.83 In 1837 or 1838,
Barr began receiving the same modest amount pursuant to the new pension
statute, almost certainly the Act of March 3, 1837.84 (Coincidentally, this
was the same statute under which Susan Decatur, as the widow of a high-
ranking officer, collected an annual pension of $600 and arrearages of
nearly $14,000.)
In 1840, Catharine married James Barr, thus forfeiting her pension.85
Nevertheless, 2 years into her marriage to James, she sought renewal of
her widow’s pension. “[M]y object,” Barr explained, “is to ascertain if
in any case you have the power to continue the pension allowed the
widow of an Officer or Seaman who dies in the naval service . . . .”86
With no mention of her marriage to James, she explained that “poverty
and ill health forces me to turn to my country and ask as a Boon that
the pension allowed me at the death of Mr. Davidson may be continued
to me a few years that I may enjoy through the liberality of my country
a few of the comforts of life wich advancing age and a sickly constitution
stand so much in need of.”87
In the final line of the 1842 letter, Barr spoke of a congressional appeal
by way of petition: “[T]he clerk of the pension office here promised me he
would write for me or send to Congress last session [but] I have not heard
that he did owing to some Difficulty on his part at the office.”88 It is not
clear whether Barr ever petitioned Congress directly. Had she done so,
Barr would have taken a path that was used by many widows, sometimes
with success, as discussed in greater detail below. But whatever the form or
status of her appeal in 1842, her efforts were unavailing.
In 1858, now approximately 61 years old and writing from Mobile,
Alabama, Barr again renewed her quest for a pension, making clear what
had been implicit in her 1842 letter to the pension administrators: although
Barr had remarried, her husband James had given her little financial
82. Ibid. See also ibid., Pension Certificate of Catharine Davidson, September 2, 1836.
83. Act of March 3, 1837, ch. 38, § 1, 5 Stat. 180.
84. File of Catharine Davidson, NARA, Records of the Department of Veterans Affairs,
RG 15, Old Wars Pension Files, Widow’s File 322, Catharine Barr to Commissioner of
Pensions, June 20, 1868.
85. Ibid., Form of Declaration for Obtaining a Renewal Widow’s Navy Pension,
September 17, 1868.
86. Ibid., Catharine Barr to Secretary of the Navy, February 14, 1842.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
“Petitions Without Number” 23
support. “[M]y husband has neither been with me or given me one dollar
for my support since 1849, and I know not his whereabouts.”89 She added,
“I hope sir if possible you will consider all this I am Old now and cannot
want a great while longer.”90 Barr’s plea for a pension was both emphatic
and desperate: “I think it is no more than right that our Country should
allow us that mite for our own Exclusive use and for no other, there are
many of us would be thankful for it in our Old age. I for one,” she
implored, “have no Dependence on Earth only what comes through my
relations.”91
Barr’s prediction of a precipitous death seems to have been overstated,
however, for in the late 1860s we find Barr back in Brooklyn, making
one final attempt to secure the pension she had been awarded based on
her brief marriage to William Davidson. She renewed her application to
the Pension Office, this time with the help of a pension claims agent, not-
ing that her husband James had died.92 But the death of a subsequent hus-
band was not generally grounds for renewal of a pension, and a notation in
her file indicates that her efforts were once again fruitless: “Application . . .
rejected the widow has remarried.”93
Barr’s letters to various pension administrators reveal that she, like
Decatur, pursued a pension with a kind of tenacity and endurance that
may seem surprising to us today. However, although Barr and Decatur
were exceptional in many regards, it was fairly typical for widows to pur-
sue pensions over a period of many years, even decades. It is also signifi-
cant that in her letters, Barr demonstrates her knowledge and consciousness
of her rights as a widow, and, in particular, of these rights as they related to
the federal pension system. Through her pursuit of a widows’ pension—
from 18 to 71 years of age—Barr acquired a fairly detailed understanding
of the inner workings of the pension system’s procedures. In 1836, soon
after William Davidson died, Barr wrote to the navy hospital seeking a
pension, and was promptly directed to the Navy Department and
provided with “a newspaper containing the forms necessary in this
89. Ibid., Catharine Barr to Commissioner of Pensions, September 8, 1858.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid., Catharine Barr to Commissioner of Pensions, June 20, 1858.
92. Ibid., Form of Declaration for Obtaining a Renewal Widow’s Navy Pension,
September 17, 1868.
93. Ibid., anonymous folder notation, November 7, 1868. Sometimes administrators––or,
on appeal, legislators––exercised leniency on this point, allowing widows to collect a pen-
sion after they had remarried and were re-widowed, even when the particular widows’
pension statute clearly terminated the widow’s pension upon remarriage. See discussion
in note 182.
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proceeding.”94 Eager for her pension, Barr immediately wrote to the Navy
Department, providing the necessary evidence and certifications.95 Over
the years, Barr’s letters recorded her familiarity with the various pension
statutes, such as the fact that some provided for pensions for life and others
for 5-year terms. She knew that remarriage meant an end to any widow’s
pension, a fact that she especially lamented after her marriage to James
Barr. When she asked for her pension to be reinstated despite her remar-
riage, she understood that she was asking for an exception to the general
rule. She also understood that pension administrators were hesitant to cre-
ate something called “precedent” that another widow might use to support
a claim. For a woman of few means and with little assistance, Barr knew a
great deal about the operation of the pension laws.
Barr’s letters also reveal that she understood the merits and equities of
her pension claim in light of her conviction that financial need should,
and sometimes did, serve as a justification for government assistance for
widows. “I have understood,” Barr wrote in 1842, “there was something
Extra allowed for those who was killed or wounded in the time of the
war, and as I understand you have a kind and generous feeling for the
poor of your Country, I have taken the liberty of asking for information
from you and I feel in hopes sir you will not deny it.”96 Equally notable
was that Barr knew that the widows’ military pension system favored
wealthy women—the Susan Decaturs of the world—and believed that
the system should be used to help needy women instead: “When i reflect
on the facts that there are many rich in this world . . . who receive their
pension that can well do without it, when the poor woman who marries
to find herself a home and then has to work hard for littel nescisaries
she may want, . . . could be allowed to retain our pension I mean the
poor like myself for our own use it would be a great comfort as a poor
woman cannot expect to marry a rich man . . . .”97
III. Widows’ Petitions as Legal and Political Process
Women’s petitioning activities in the early nineteenth century are not news
to students of the period. We have long known about reform-oriented peti-
tioning campaigns, such as those led by abolitionist and anti-removal
94. File of Catharine Davidson, NARA, Records of the Department of Veterans Affairs,
RG 15, Old Wars Pension Files, Widow’s File 322, M. G. Delancy to Catharine Davidson,
July 27, 1836.
95. Ibid., Catharine Davidson to M. Dickerson, August 29, 1836.
96. Ibid., Catharine Barr to Secretary of the Navy, February 14, 1842.
97. Ibid.
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organizations.98 In light of the expansion of white manhood suffrage in the
early nineteenth century, however, women’s petitions sometimes appear to
have operated as a degrading substitute for the ballot. Discursive conven-
tions marked the petition as a political-legal tool of the early modern sub-
ject, rather than the modern citizen. As Linda Kerber has suggested with
respect to women’s petitions of the Revolutionary era, petitioning was a
particularly suitable mode of political behavior for women because the
petition “begins in the acknowledgement of subordination . . . . The rheto-
ric of humility is a necessary part of the petition as a genre, whether or not
humility is felt in fact.”99 As a generic form, the petition predates a
progressive-liberal tradition in which disgruntled groups declare their
rights, a tradition that some American women joined in 1848 with the
Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions. Seen in this light, the experi-
ences of Decatur and Barr would seem to be best understood as individual
legal episodes of little significance to the grand arc of women’s legal his-
tory, or to the emergence of a form of social provision that remains vital in
American law and social policy. But a closer look at the evolution of mili-
tary widows’ pensions reveals the centrality of widows’ petitions to the
development of the first system of centralized public marriage-based
entitlements.
Despite the humble conventions of the petition, in the early nineteenth
century it provided a means by which individuals could, and regularly
did, assert formal claims on the state and federal governments. Men and
women petitioned Congress for compensation when the government
destroyed their property, or when troops consumed their provisions or live-
stock.100 Disasters both natural and man-made precipitated waves of peti-
tions for emergency relief.101 Government officials frequently petitioned
Congress for indemnification after being found liable for tortious conduct
in the execution of their duties.102 Veterans petitioned Congress for pen-
sions and land bounties,103 and towns petitioned Congress for postal routes
98. See sources cited in note 10.
99. Kerber, Women of the Republic, 85. For a wonderful examination of the differences in
the rhetorical modes of men’s and women’s anti-removal petitions, see Portnoy, Their Right
to Speak, 71–78.
100. Cynthia A. Kierner, Beyond the Household: Women’s Place in the Early South,
1700–1835 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 97–99.
101. See Michele L. Landis, ‘Let Me Next Time Be “Tried by Fire”’: Disaster Relief and
the Origins of the American Welfare State, 1789–1874,” Northwestern University Law
Review 92 (1998): 978–81.
102. See James E. Pfander and Jonathan L. Hunt, “Public Wrongs and Private Bills:
Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic,” New York
University Law Review 85 (2010): 1932–39.
103. See Jensen, Patriots, 68–69; and Resch, Suffering Soldiers, 85–91.
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and post offices.104 Women petitioned state legislatures for all manner of
relief, including divorce, protection of their assets from their husbands’
creditors, and recognition of feme sole status for purposes of trading.105
On the more altruistic end of the spectrum, women petitioned for recog-
nition and incorporation of benevolent societies, and for appropriations
of cash and land subsidies to support the societies’ missions.106 When
widows petitioned Congress for pensions, they engaged in a well-
established, and presumably well-understood, legal process.
By the 1810s, widows seeking pensions petitioned Congress in two
ways. A widow who clearly did not qualify for a pension under one
of the general pension laws would often petition directly for a bill for
private relief: an individual appropriation. That was Susan Decatur’s
approach. However, many of the widows who petitioned Congress for
a pension had already sought one using the administrative claim pro-
cedure that had been established to implement the general pension
laws. That was Barr’s path to a pension. If a widow’s claim was denied
by the administrators, she could appeal to Congress by petition—an
option used by hundreds of widows, perhaps including Barr.107
Regardless of the route to Congress, a widow rarely traveled it alone. A
widow such as Decatur received the assistance of a network of men in
Congress and the executive branch,108 but widows of little means also
received significant help from pension claims agents, family members,
neighbors, and, occasionally, town officials or groups of supporters.
Probably because of the complexities involved in petitioning for a pension
and the limited literacy or illiteracy of some petitioners, widows’ pension
petitions, like veterans’ pension petitions of the same period, were often
written by another—usually the agent—although they were always
104. See Richard John, Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin
to Morse (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 49–50.
105. See Kierner, Beyond the Household, 125–27; Cott, The Bonds of Womanhood, 7; see
also Ruth Bogin, “Petitioning and the New Moral Economy of Post-Revolutionary
America,” William & Mary Quarterly 45 (1988): 391–425.
106. See Suzanne Lebsock, The Free Women of Petersburg: Status and Culture in a
Southern Town, 1784–1860 (New York: Norton, 1984), 196–201. At the federal level,
from 1848 to 1854, Dorothea Dix famously petitioned Congress for a land grant with the
intention of selling the land to provide relief and support for the poor and insane. See
Thomas J. Brown, Dorothea Dix: New England Reformer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1998), 148–214.
107. For a discussion of this appeal process, see Collins, “Administering Marriage,”
1129–45.
108. See, for example, sources cited in note 55.
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necessarily signed or marked by the widow herself.109 It would be a mis-
take, however, to dismiss the widows’ involvement in the petitioning pro-
cess.110 Others undoubtedly helped widows, but community involvement
with a widow’s pension application or petition was also a matter of admin-
istrative necessity, as the general pension statutes required that the widow
gather written testimony from neighbors and family members who had per-
sonal knowledge of particular facts relevant to the widows’ eligibility.111
Moreover, these petitions usually were not the result of organized collec-
tive action of the sort that was obviously behind abolitionist and anti-
removal petitions. As discussed below, widows sometimes petitioned in
small groups, and those group petitions appear to have been effective in
109. For a useful discussion of various forms of literacy among men and women in this
period, and the difficulty of determining literacy rates, see Carl F. Kaestle, “The History of
Literacy and the History of Readers,” Review of Research in Education 12 (1985): 11–53.
110. One possible theory is that the lion’s share of the pressure to enact military widows’
pensions came from men––men who risked their lives in war and who were gradually being
incorporated into the ranks of the enfranchised. It is clear that men and groups of men some-
times pressed for widows’ pensions. See, for example, Committee on Military Affairs,
Pamela Adams, H.R. Rep. 23–328, 2–3 (1834) (report reprinting letter signed by 97 men
in support of a widow’s pension petition); Journal of the House of Representatives 341
(28th Cong., 1st Sess. 1844) (Representative David L. Seymour presenting a resolution of
the State of New York urging extension of Revolutionary War widows’ pensions); and
Journal of the House of Representatives 343 (28th Cong., 1st Sess. 1844) (Representative
Jacob Collamer presenting a “Joint Resolution Relative to Pensions to Widows of
Revolutionary Officers and Soldiers” on behalf of the Vermont state legislature).
However, upon closer analysis this explanation is only partial, and is in certain respects mis-
leading. As an initial matter, many of the military widows’ pensions––even for traditional
war widows––were granted retroactively, suggesting that men did not routinely insist on
widows’ pensions as a condition for service. See, for example, Act of March 4, 1814,
ch. 20, §§ 1–2, 3 Stat. 103, 103–4; Act of April 16, 1816, ch. 55, §§ 1–2, 3 Stat. 285,
285–86; and Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 362, § 1, 5 Stat. 127, 127–28. Moreover, as classes
of potential pensioners, veterans and widows were sometimes in direct competition for
resources, revealing a misalignment of interests between veterans (at least some of whom
were enfranchised) and widows (none of whom were enfranchised). Indeed, in the 1830s,
some officers actively petitioned against proposals that would fund officers’ widows’ pen-
sions from a tax levied on officers’ regular pay. See, for example, Memorial of Sundry
Officers of the Army and Military Academy Remonstrating Against the Passage of the
“Bill to Provide for the Support of Widows and Orphans of Such Officers of the Army as
May Die While in Service of the United States,” H.R. Rep. 23–74 (1834); Memorial of a
Committee of Officers Stationed at Fort Monroe, H.R. Rep. No. 23–130 (1834); Petition
Against Bill to Provide for Widows of Officers, H.R. Rep. No. 23–205 (1834); and
Remonstrance of Officers of the Army and Military Academy Against Taxing Their Pay
for the Support of Widows and Orphans of Deceased Officers, S. Rep. No. 23–563
(1834). In short, although there is no doubt that men––fathers, brothers, adult sons, neigh-
bors, and town officials––had an interest in securing assistance for widows, widows them-
selves were the most active proponents of widows’ pensions.
111. See Collins, “Administering Marriage,” 1130–40.
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drawing attention to the merits of widows’ claim on the public treasure.
However, the vast majority of the widows’ pension petitions were sub-
mitted by individual widows seeking individual relief.
In short, most widows’ pension petitions demonstrate neither heroic
individualism navigating the legal system nor reform-style organization.
Rather, they are evidence of widows’ participation in, and active utilization
of, a well-established process of seeking relief and recognition of legal
rights, old and new, from the national legislature.112 Widows’ petitions
reflect their understanding—which others shared—that it was right and
proper for them to reach out to the federal government for monetary assist-
ance, and that the federal government should provide that assistance. And,
as shown below, although widows’ petitions were not always successful in
the immediate term, collectively and over time these petitions prompted
Congress to provide pensions for military widows.
A. Widows on the National Legislative Agenda
Widows’ petitions influenced the legislative development of the military
pension system by ensuring that widows’ needs—and their claims on the
polity—were on Congress’s agenda. This may seem like a minor point,
but in the world of legislative process agenda setting was a crucial step
in the transformation of an idea or a need into a codified, enforceable
right or duty. In this respect, the widows had legislative custom and the
federal Constitution on their side. Under the First Amendment, widows
had a right to petition Congress. That right did not ensure that their peti-
tions would be answered affirmatively, or even that they would be formally
“submitted” through congressional procedures, but it undoubtedly imbued
national legislators with a felt obligation to consider citizens’ petitions,
including those from widows.113
112. In this regard, the widows’ pension petitions and statutes support Barbara
Yngvesson’s important observation that law “is neither ‘from above’ nor ‘from below’
but simultaneously separate and immanent, imposed and participatory.” Barbara
Yngvesson, “Making Law at the Doorway: The Clerk, the Court, and the Construction of
Community in a New England Town,” Law & Society Review 22 (1988): 412.
113. I take no position on whether the First Amendment petition clause obliged Congress,
or any other branch of the federal government, to formally consider the petitions it received.
Compare Julie M. Spanbauer, “The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for
Redress of Grievances: Cut from a Different Cloth,” Hastings Constitutional Law
Quarterly 21 (1993): 17, with Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, “Downsizing the Right to
Petition,” Northwestern University Law Review 93 (1999): 739–40. As a matter of practice,
it is almost certain that some widows’ petitions were not considered at all. However, the fact
that legislators appear to have been generally responsive to widows’ pension petitions for
individual relief, even if they did not usually act on them affirmatively, suggests that the
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Other aspects of the legislative process affected Congress’s response to
widows’ pension petitions. By the 1810s, Congress had developed several
standing committees to investigate the merits of military pension peti-
tions.114 Although the membership of committees varied slightly from ses-
sion to session,115 the committee system brought some measure of
consistency to the petition review process. A relatively small, stable
group of legislators evaluated individual widows’ petitions. Thus,
Decatur’s petitions were vetted by the same subset of legislators who
assessed the merits of petitions submitted by widows of lesser means
and status.
With this legislative apparatus in mind, one can trace the influence of
widows’ petitions on the enactment of two important general widows’ pen-
sion acts in 1836. In March of that year, Congress enacted a general pen-
sion statute that altered the status quo with respect to pensions for soldiers’
war widows. Prior to 1836, Congress had received many pension petitions
from widows of soldiers and seamen killed in service,116 and starting in the
1810s Congress enacted several general pension statutes for the benefit of
such widows.117 Nevertheless, the default rule remained that only officers’
wives were granted pensions if their husbands died in battle.118 Then, in
1836, in a direct response to “a petition in behalf of the widow and children
legal tradition mandating some sort of response was a strong one, indeed. See Gregory A.
Mark, “The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance of the Right to Petition,”
Fordham Law Review 66 (1998): 2160 (“The government . . . felt a socio-political obligation
to hear those grievances [expressed in petitions], to provide a response, and often to act upon
the complaints.”).
114. See Norman K. Risjord, “Congress in the Federalist-Republican Era,”
in Encyclopedia of the American Legislative System, ed. Joel H. Sibley (New York:
Scribner, 1994), I:99–109.
115. Ibid., 103 table 2.
116. See, for example, Pension, February 20, 1819, American State Papers: Claims 1: 675
(committee report on the petition of Ruth Reed); On the Claim of the Widow of a Seaman
Who Died in Dartmoor Prison, in England, to Five Years’ Half-Pay, February 3, 1827,
American State Papers: Naval Affairs 3: 24 (committee report on the petition of Abigail
Appleton); Committee on Invalid Pensions, Thankful Randall, H.R. Rep. No. 23–89
(1835). Congress also received petitions from officers’ widows who, for whatever reason,
did not qualify for a pension under the general pension statutes. See, for example,
Committee on Pensions, S. Rep. No. 16–72 (1820) (report on the petition of Catharine
Shapley); Committee on Military Pensions, Polly Campbell, H.R. Rep. No. 20–232
(1828); and Committee on Naval Affairs, Sophia Gardner, H.R. Rep. 21–113 (1831). See
also Army Contractor Killed by the Enemy, February 15, 1804, American State Papers:
Claims, 1:297 (committee report on the petition of Ann Elliot).
117. For examples of pre-1836 general pension statutes granting pensions to widows of
soldiers killed in battle, see statutes listed in note 19.
118. See The First System of Public Marriage-Based Entitlements (text section I.)
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of Major Dade, Captain G. W. Gardiner, Lieut. Bessinger, and other such
widows and children of officers, non-commissioned officers and men,”
Congress abandoned the piecemeal approach.119 Dade, Gardiner, and
Bessinger had been killed along with 105 other men in a widely reported
battle with the Seminole Indians in Florida.120 Petitioners implored
Congress “to alleviate their distresses by feeding the widows, and enabling
the mothers to feed and educate their children.”121 A lengthy committee
report reviewed the long history of awarding pensions to officers’ widows
as a routine matter but to soldiers’ widows on an ad hoc basis only.
Invoking and reaffirming the centrality of the citizen-soldier ideal for
men and married women’s dependence, the report concluded that widows’
pensions (for all ranks) “should be permanent . . . as to give a pledge to the
citizen soldier, if he dies in the service, his wife and children should not
beg their bread.”122 Approximately 2 weeks later, Congress enacted a gen-
eral pension statute that changed the default rule for the military establish-
ment by providing for widows of “privates,” as well as “officers [and]
non-commissioned officers” who died in the line of duty.123
A similar pattern of petitioning precipitated the enactment of widows’
service-based pensions for large classes of aging widows of veterans of
the Revolutionary War, also regardless of the veteran’s rank. In the
late 1820s, motivated in part by Congress’s provision of service-based
pensions for Revolutionary War veterans,124 the aging widows of
Revolutionary War veterans began petitioning Congress in more substan-
tial numbers. Most Revolutionary War widows’ petitions were submitted
by individual widows seeking individual relief,125 but on at least three
119. Committee of Claims, Major Dade, et al.––Pensions to Widows and Children, H.R.
Rep. No. 24–415 (1836).
120. See, for example, “Horrid Massacre!,” Pittsfield Sun, February 4, 1836, at 2;
“Reported Indian Massacre,” Portsmouth Journal of Literature and Politics, January 30,
1836, at 3; “Slaughter of a Detachment of U.S. Troops by the Seminoles, on the 28th of
December,” Connecticut Courant, February 1, 1836, at 2.
121. Committee of Claims, Major Dade, et al.––Pensions to Widows and Children, H.R.
Rep. No. 24–415 (1836).
122. Ibid., 3.
123. Act of March 19, 1836, ch. 44, §§ 1, 5, 5 Stat. 7, 7.
124. Revolutionary War veterans had been awarded need-based service-based pensions in
1818. See Act of March 18, 1818, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 410, 410–11. Over the course of the following
decade, the veterans successfully petitioned for the creation of service-based pensions not tied
to financial need, codified in the Act of May 15, 1828, ch. 53, 4 Stat. 269, 269–70. For a rich
and illuminating discussion of the political forces that helped give rise to veterans’ service-
based pensions, see Jensen, Patriots, 62–122.
125. See, for example, Committee on Pensions, S. Rep. No. 21–69 (1830) (report on the
petition of Elizabeth Anderson); Committee on Revolutionary Claims, Martha Yeomans, H.
R. Rep. No. 21–154 (1830); Committee on Revolutionary Claims, Elizabeth Dandridge, H.
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occasions, small groups of widows petitioned Congress seeking pensions,
not just for themselves, but for all widows who had been married to
Revolutionary War officers who had survived the war. Two of these peti-
tions were signed by a small group of New England widows, including
Caroline Langdon Eustis, Tabitha Tenney, Elizabeth Adams, Lydia
Fogg, and Mary Emery.126 As the widow of William Eustis, secretary of
war under James Madison and governor of Massachusetts, Caroline
Eustis was the most socially elite of the signatories,127 but correspondence
between Eustis and Tenney, another signatory, reveals that Tenney was the
organizer and likely the author of the petitions.128 In 1801, while living in
Washington, D.C., with her husband Representative Samuel Tenney,
Tabitha Gilman Tenney wrote the best-selling novel Female Quixotism,
Exhibited in the Romantic Opinions and Extravagant Adventures of
Dorcasina Sheldon.129 Twenty-eight years later, Tenney was a 67-year-old
R. Rep. No. 21–182 (1830); and Committee on Revolutionary Claims, Nancy Davis, H.R.
Rep. No. 21–324 (1830).
126. Petition of [Martha] Poor, Elizabeth Adams, Lydia Fogg, Mary Emery, T. Tenney,
and Caroline L. Eustis, NARA, Records of the House of Representatives, RG 233, 21st
Congress, 1st Session, Committee on Military Pensions, Tray HR21A-G13.1 (Petitions),
Folder Wham–Yeomans, printed in Select Committee, Petitions of Widows of Officers of
the Revolutionary Army, H.R. Rep. No. 21–4, at 4 (1830); and Memorial of Certain
Widows of Revolutionary Officers, January 18, 1830, NARA, Records of the United
States Senate, RG 46, Committee on Revolutionary Pensions, file SEN 21A-G13, tray
31B (petition of Caroline Langdon Eustis, T. Tenney, Elizabeth Adams, M[ary] Emery,
and Lydia Fogg). The New England widows’ first petition was formally presented in the
House on February 16, 1829, along with the New Jersey widows’ petition described in
text accompanying notes 133–35. See Journal of the House of Representatives 289–90
(20th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1829). The New England widows’ second petition was presented
in the Senate on January 18, 1830. See Journal of the Senate 86 (21st Cong., 1st Sess.
1830). See also note 140 and accompanying text.
127. Petition of Caroline L. Eustis, October 31, 1849, NARA, Records of the United
States Senate, RG 46, 32A-H15, Committee on Revolutionary Pensions, Tray 1, Folder 4.
128. See sources cited in below notes 137–39.
129. Tabitha Gilman Tenney, Female Quixotism, Exhibited in the Romantic Opinions and
Extravagant Adventures of Dorcasina Sheldon, 2 vols. (Boston: I. Thomas and E.T.
Andrews, 1801). See also Cathy N. Davidson, Revolution and the Word: The Rise of the
Novel in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 280–82. Although Eustis tra-
veled in the most elite circles of American society, all of the widows who signed the petition
were from well-established New England families. For example, Samuel Tenney and
William Eustis were classmates at Harvard and Tenney later served as a surgeon’s mate
under Eustis during the war before serving as a surgeon in his own right. Thomas Francis
Harrington, The Harvard Medical School: A History, Narrative and Documentary
(New York: Lewis Publishing Co., 1905), 1:55, 63. The two men also served in Congress
together. The Elizabeth Adams who signed the petition was most likely Elizabeth Parker
Adams of Tenney’s hometown, Exeter, New Hampshire. Adams was the widow of a
Revolutionary War lieutenant, Samuel Adams. File of Elizabeth Adams, NARA, Records
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widow living in Exeter, New Hampshire. If Tenney’s novel can be read as
a critique of contemporary patriarchal norms, social and legal, that chan-
neled American women into marriage and demoralizing domesticity,130
her widows’ pension petitions implicitly reaffirmed marriage as key source
of women’s status in the polity. But whereas Tenney’s petitions undoubt-
edly based the widows’ claim to public monies on their marriages to
worthy husbands, rhetorically, the petitions emphasized the widows’
own wartime contributions. The first petition, submitted in 1829, explained
“[t]hat in the arduous struggle for the Independence of these American
States, they shared with their now deceased partners in many of the
Perils, and suffered with them in many of the hardships, incident to that
. . . period.”131 Noting that “some of ” the widows were in “humble cir-
cumstances,” they sought “the assistance of their country for support.”132
The same year, 1829, a small group of widows from New Jersey—Mary
Hunter, Susanna Armstrong, Susan Dayton, and Sarah Cumming—also
submitted a petition seeking service-based pensions as Revolutionary
War widows.133 They, too, were widows of officers and they also drew
attention to women’s wartime suffering and labors as justification for
widows’ pensions.134 Although the widows did not “partake of the dangers
of the Department of Veterans Affairs, RG 15, Series M804, W 20564, Declaration of
Elizabeth Adams, August 15, 1838. Adams was related by marriage to Lydia Fogg, as
Adams’s grandfather, Reverend Jeremiah Fogg, was Lydia’s father-in-law. Ibid. Lydia
Fogg lived just south of Exeter in Kensington, New Hampshire and was the widow of
Jeremiah Fogg, a major in the Revolutionary War. File of Lydia Fogg, NARA, Records
of the Department of Veterans Affairs, RG 15, Series M804, W 16116, Declaration of
Lydia Fogg, August 15, 1838. Major Fogg was a 1768 graduate of Harvard College and,
following the Revolution, a senator in the New Hampshire State Senate. See Jeremiah
Fogg, Journal of Major Jeremiah Fogg During the Expedition of Gen. Sullivan in 1779
Against the Western Indians (Exeter, N.H.: The New Letter Press, 1879), 1.
130. Davidson, Revolution and the Word, 278.
131. Petition of [Martha] Poor, Elizabeth Adams, Lydia Fogg, Mary Emery, T. Tenney,
and Caroline L. Eustis, NARA, Records of the House of Representatives, RG 233, 21st
Congress, 1st Session, Committee on Military Pensions, Tray HR21A-G13.1 (Petitions),
Folder Wham–Yeomans.
132. Ibid.
133. Select Committee, Petitions of Widows of Officers of the Revolutionary Army, H.R.
Rep. No. 21–4, 3–4 (1830) (printing memorial of widows Mary S. Hunter, Susanna
Armstrong, Susan Dayton, and Sarah Cumming); Journal of the House of Representatives
290 (20th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1829) (presentation of memorial of widows Hunter,
Armstrong, Dayton, and Cumming).
134. For example, Dayton was the widow of the Revolutionary War general Jonathan
Dayton, who was a high-ranking Federalist until he was arrested for treason in 1807 for
his alleged role in the Burr Conspiracy. New International Encyclopedia, 2nd ed.
(New York: Dodd, Mead, 1914), 6:548. Sarah Cumming was the widow of John
N. Cumming, a colonel in the Continental Army. File of Sarah Cumming, NARA,
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and hardships and privations of their husbands,” they explained, “it was
their lot to endure constantly the far more exquisite pains which the
heart of woman feels when he to whom she is connected by the nearest
and most tender ties is engaged in battle . . . .”135
Despite these particular widows’ relative access to power, neither of
these petitions resulted in a private act for any of the petitioning widows,
nor did they result in an immediate change to the general pension laws. In
1829, the House voted in favor of a bill that would have provided pensions
to “each surviving widow who was, at the close of the Revolutionary war,
the lawful wife of a[n] . . . officer, musician, or private of said war,” but the
bill never made it out of the Senate.136
Undeterred by her first petition’s failure, Tabitha Tenney tried again. In
November 1829, Tenney wrote to Caroline Eustis soliciting her signature
on a second pension petition. In the letter, Tenney described the fate of
the first petition “she caused . . . to be written . . . in behalf of most of
the surviving widows of the officers of the revolutionary war”137 and
then declared her resolve. “I am now determined to make another attempt,
& I inclose a petition for your signature, if you judge proper to join me in
it.”138 Eustis obliged and sent the signed petition back to Tenney. Tenney
gathered the signatures of all but one of the widows who had signed the
first petition and then, several weeks later, wrote to Eustis seeking
additional help. Confessing that she “ha[s] now scarcely a single acquain-
tance in either house,” as it had been “so long since my husband was in
Congress,” Tenney asked Eustis to use her connections in Congress to
ensure that the petition was presented effectively: “[U]pon the supposition
that you have among the members a number of friends & acquaintances, I
Records of the Department of Veterans Affairs, RG 15, Series M804, W 7234, Declaration
of Sarah Cumming, October 21, 1836. Susanna Armstrong was the widow of the Reverend
James Armstrong, who graduated from the College of New Jersey (which was later renamed
Princeton) and served as a trustee in the 1790s. See John Maclean, History of the College of
New Jersey from Its Origin in 1746 to the Commencement of 1854 (Philadelphia: J.B.
Lippincott, 1877), 2:110.
135. Select Committee, Petitions of Widows of Officers of the Revolutionary Army, H.R.
Rep. No. 21–4, 3 (1830).
136. H.R. 405, 20th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1829); Journal of the House of Representatives 328
(20th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1829).
137. T. Tenney to Caroline Langdon Eustis, November 17, 1829, NARA, Records of the
United States Senate, RG 46, Committee on Revolutionary Pensions, file SEN 21A-G13,
tray 31B. Given that the petition appears to have been physically penned by a scrivener,
it is not clear whether Tenney’s assertion that she “caused” the petition “to be written”
means that she composed the petition but then had it transcribed, or that she enlisted the ser-
vices of a pension claims agent, lawyer, or other acquaintance to compose the petition.
138. Ibid.
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have judged it best to send the petition again to you & request you forward
it to some member of the house who is capable of speaking & of informing
our claim.”139 Tenney suggested that Eustis enlist the help of
Massachusetts senator Daniel Webster. A few weeks later, on January
18, 1830, Webster formally presented the New England widows’ second
petition in the Senate.140 Despite Eustis’s connections and Tenney’s deter-
mined efforts, however, their second petition also failed to yield an
immediate result.
Although Congress did not grant these widows’ petitions, it would be
wrong to conclude that the petitions were ineffectual. All three of these
group petitions—as well as a raft of individual widows’ petitions—drew
national lawmakers’ attention to the claims of Revolutionary War widows
and inaugurated a process that, within a few years, resulted in the creation
of service-based pensions for large classes of aging widows. Committee
reports issued on Revolutionary War widows’ pension petitions of the
early 1830s reveal legislators’ hesitance to continue providing ad hoc pri-
vate relief for widows, and their inclination to provide broad-scale, sys-
tematic relief instead. For example, a committee report issued on the
New England widows’ second petition recommended against acting on it
because the committee members could not “consider this case as embraced
within the meaning of any of the [general] pension acts.”141 However, the
report was not without hope, noting that “the case of the petitioners pre-
sents a very strong and powerful appeal to the justice of the
Government.”142 Three years later, the petition of the Revolutionary War
widow Anne Royall—another widow with significant connections in
Washington143—prompted the House Committee on Military Affairs to
state that, “frankly . . . while they cannot recommend a special law for
any particular widow of a particular officer,” nevertheless it was “worthy
of the most serious consideration whether a general provision ought not
139. Ibid. (emphasis in original).
140. Journal of the Senate 86 (21st Cong., 1st Sess. 1830).
141. Committee on Pensions, Report, S. Rep. No. 21–70 (1830).
142. Ibid. In rejecting the pension petition of Celestine Wilkinson, the widow of Brigadier
General James Wilkinson, the Senate Committee on Pensions explained that “[i]t has not
been the policy of this Government to adopt the system of granting pensions for military
services merely.” Committee on Pensions, S. Rep. No. 21–71 (1830) (report on the petition
of Celestine Wilkinson).
143. Anne Royall was the widow of William Royall, who was a major in the
Revolutionary War. Her quest for a pension may have been what brought her to
Washington, D.C., in 1824, where she established herself as the first professional woman
journalist in America. See Bessie Rowland James, Anne Royall’s U.S.A (New Brunswick,
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1972), 104–14.
“Petitions Without Number” 35
to be made for all the surviving widows . . . of the revolution.”144 The peti-
tions submitted by widows such as Eustis and Royall—well connected in
Washington’s world of patronage—were considered along with the petitions
of widows of lesser means and status.145 Together, these widows’ petitions
focused Congress’s attention on the issue of service-based pensions for aging
widows of the Revolutionary War.
In July 1836, in response to “several petitions, memorials, and resol-
utions” by widows seeking service-based pensions, the House
Committee on Revolutionary Pensions returned a favorable report, con-
cluding that “the wives of those persons engaged in the revolutionary
struggle” were “entitled” to pensions.146 This report picked up the logic
of petitions such as those submitted by the New England and New
Jersey widows, which called attention to women’s wartime work and pri-
vations. When men left for the battlefield, the report explained, “the labors
of the hardier sex devolved upon females, and the services and sufferings
were, in very many instances, equally shared.”147 The report continued, “It is
rightly urged that the wife has an interest in her husband’s services, and her
claim to partake of the recompense will not be denied.”148 On July 4, 1836,
Congress took the significant step of enacting a general pension law for
widows of Revolutionary War veterans—from high-ranking officers to
privates—who had married their husbands prior to or during the war.149
144. Committee on Military Affairs, Anne Royall, H.R. Rep. No. 23–100 (1833).
145. See, for example, sources cited in note 125.
146. See Committee on Revolutionary Pensions, Revolutionary Pensions, H.R. Rep. No.
24–210, at 2–3 (1836).
147. Ibid., 3. The committee’s focus on wives’ wartime contributions supported its rec-
ommendation to limit pensions to those widows “whose marriage occurred previous to
the expiration of [their husband’s] service.” Ibid., 2. The notion that pensions for
Revolutionary War widows were justified, in significant part, by the widows’ service to
country and husband was articulated in several congressional reports. In 1839, the House
Committee on Revolutionary War Pensions explained that “the wives of our revolutionary
patriots, upon whom devolved the whole management of the domestic concerns of the
family, during the absence of the husband . . . had much of the troubles, the anxieties,
and dangers of the revolutionary struggle to encounter, all will admit.” Committee on
Revolutionary Pensions, Margaret Wade, H.R. Rep. No. 25–309 (1839). An 1848 House
Committee Report provides a similar explanation of the Act of July 4, 1836, noting that
the act “was passed, in order to provide for those venerable widows who had shared with
their husbands in the sufferings and toils of the revolution.” Committee on Revolutionary
Pensions, H.R. Rep. No. 31–295, 2 (1848).
148. Committee on Revolutionary Pensions, Revolutionary Pensions, H.R. Rep. No. 24–210,
3 (1836).
149. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 362, § 3, 5 Stat. 127, 128. For details of the operation of
Section 3 of the July 4, 1836 statute, see discussion in note 24.
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Once Congress had enacted a general pension law, eligible widows
applied for pensions using an involved procedure administered by the
Pension Office, which was first housed in the Department of War and
then, starting in 1849, in the Department of the Interior. But the delegation
of such determinations to administrative agencies did not stanch the flow of
widows’ petitions to Congress. Widows, usually acting individually, contin-
ued to petition Congress for material support, either directly or by way of an
appeal from the Pension Office. The number of widows’ pension petitions
varied significantly from Congress to Congress. For example, during the
Twenty-First Congress (1829–1831) national legislators entertained the pen-
sion petitions of at least 78 widows; during the Twenty-Fifth Congress
(1837–1839) they considered at least 424 widows’ pension petitions; during
the Twenty-Sixth Congress (1839–1841) they considered approximately
396 widows’ pension petitions; and during the Thirty-First Congress
(1849–1851), they considered at least 182 widows’ pension petitions.150
Despite the ebb and flow, widows’ petitions were a constant feature of
Congress’s agenda, especially in the 1830s and 1840s.
Widows’ petitions prompted Congress repeatedly to reconsider the lines
it had drawn between the eligible and the ineligible.151 In 1839, the House
150. These numbers are estimates based on references in the Senate and House journals to
widows’ pension petitions formally submitted to and considered by Congress, and in related
bills and reports. This information was compiled using the text-searchable online versions of
the journals on the Library of Congress American Memory website http://memory.loc.gov/
ammem/hlawquery.html (last accessed September 29, 2011). After gathering references to the
term “widow” and recording all references to widows’ petitions, I then collected bills and com-
mittee reports associated with each widow’s name to determine whether, in fact, the widow
sought a pension (rather than some other form of relief fromCongress).When in doubt, I omitted
the widow’s petition from the count. A similar search was performed in the “Bills and
Resolutions” database on the Library of Congress website and the information similarly cross-
checked against other sources. This method is by no means perfect, but neither are the alterna-
tives. On the one hand, relying on digitized records likely leads to underestimation of the number
of widows’ petitions submitted to Congress, as technological limitations almost surely prevent
retrieval of all references towidows’ pension petitions, evenwith careful searching. On the other
hand, my experience in the National Archives suggests that many actual petitions have been lost
or misfiled, making those records an imperfect source as well. Cross-checks of existing registers
of petitions to Congress from and of this period also reveal significant omissions. Finally, there is
a problem that riddles any effort to determine how many widows petitioned Congress for pen-
sions during this period: it is far from clear that every petition received by a representative or
senator was formally submitted to Congress. As per routine practice, any petition not submitted
to Congress by the end of a legislative session was returned to the petitioner. Kenneth Kato,
Archives Specialist, Center for LegislativeArchives, NARA,Washington,D.C., telephone inter-
view with the author, April 13, 2010.
151. See, for example, Committee on Revolutionary Claims, Ann Mortimer Barron, H.
R. Rep. No. 23–58 (1833) (navy widow seeking benefit of army widows’ pension statute);
Committee on Revolutionary Pensions, Jerusha Ripley, H.R. Rep. No. 24–77 (1837) (widow
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Committee on Revolutionary Pensions reported on the petition of Margaret
Wade. The service-based widows’ pensions provided by the July 4, 1836
Act were available only to widows who had married a Revolutionary War
officer or soldier “before the expiration of the last period of his service.”152
In 1837, Congress extended that Act to include all Revolutionary War
widows who had married a soldier or veteran prior to January 1,
1794.153 Widow Wade had married a Revolutionary War veteran in June
1794, only 6 months after the cutoff date. The Committee could articulate
no principled distinction, and instead declared that “the committee think
the distinction . . . invidious and unjust.”154
Widow Wade’s petition did not yield a direct legislative response or
result in a pension. As was often the case, lawmakers were hesitant to
“legislate for any particular cases,”155 but as early as 1837 they had
expressed “confidence that, by some general provision, the benefits of
the [1836] act . . . will be extended so as to embrace the cases of all persons
who are now the widows of those who served in the revolutionary war.”156
They were right. Over the years, the pressure of petitions such as Widow
Wade’s pushed Congress to expand eligibility criteria, resulting in a steady
enlargement of the scope of the July 4, 1836 Act. By 1853, virtually any
woman who had ever been married to a Revolutionary War veteran was
eligible for a service-based pension.157 The result: in the early nineteenth
century, tens of thousands of widows were placed on the federal pension
rolls.
B. Leveling Up: Every Widow’s Pension
Although it is evident that widows’ petitions put widows’ pensions on the
legislative agenda, this alone cannot explain why, slowly but surely,
Congress responded to widows’ petitions through the enactment of general
pension statutes for large classes of widows. It is also not enough to
observe that early nineteenth-century widows’ pensions resembled relief
petitions Congress for pension despite the fact that she had remarried); and Committee on
Revolutionary Pensions, Hannah Eldridge, H.R. Rep. No. 24–124 (1837) (widow petitions
Congress seeking pension despite the fact that she had remarried).
152. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 362, § 3, 5 Stat. 127, 128.
153. See Act of July 7, 1837, ch. 189, § 2, 5 Stat. 303, 303.
154. See Committee on Revolutionary Pensions, Margaret Wade, H.R. Rep. No. 25–309,
1–2 (1839).
155. Committee on Pensions, S. Rep No. 24–146 (1837) (report on the petition of Sarah
Rogers).
156. Ibid.
157. See sources cited in note 26.
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provided by a growing number of charitable organizations and societies to
widows and children in the same period.158 Certainly, widows’ pensions
and charitable relief were born of a similar benevolence, and legislators fre-
quently used the language of charity when describing widows’ pensions;
however, military widows’ pensions were not charity. The pension statutes
created legal entitlements—rights—for widows to be paid out of the public
coffers. And in this regard, military widows’ pensions should be understood
as part of a larger shift in the early nineteenth-century American legal land-
scape: the significant expansion of the social welfare function of marriage.
Under the doctrine of coverture, marriage stripped women of many of
their property rights, thus usually leaving them disempowered financially
during marriage, and often in dire straits if they were widowed.159
Traditional marriage law and related legal doctrines attempted to compen-
sate for married women’s legal disabilities by enabling or requiring the
husband, or his estate, to provide a modicum of financial support for the
wife or widow. For example, under the doctrine of necessaries, a husband
could be held liable for essentials, such as food and clothing, purchased by
his wife on credit.160 Dower, the widow’s right to one third of her hus-
band’s real property, had long provided limited financial resources for
widows of propertied husbands.161 In addition, fathers and husbands of
means sometimes used trusts or separate estates to insulate their daughters
and wives from the harshest consequences of marital property laws.162
In the early nineteenth century, however, as America’s economy became
increasingly industrialized and dominated by commercial markets, it
became evident that whatever financial protections these traditional legal
devices had provided for married women, they were inadequate during
both marriage and widowhood. Industrial accidents claimed the lives of
158. See Lori D. Ginzberg, Women and the Work of Benevolence: Morality, Politics and
Class in the Nineteenth-Century United States (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990);
Ronald G. Walters, American Reformers, 1815–1860 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978);
and Anne M. Boylan, “Women in Groups: An Analysis of Women’s Benevolent
Organizations in New York and Boston, 1797–1840,” Journal of American History 71
(1984): 497–523.
159. See Alexander Keyssar, “Widowhood in Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts: A
Problem in the History of the Family,” Perspectives in American History 8 (1974): 112.
160. See Tapping Reeve, The Law of Baron and Femme, of Parent and Child, Guardian
and Ward, Master and Servant, and of the Powers of Courts of Chancery (New York:
Banks, Gould, 1841): 80–81.
161. In the majority of American jurisdictions, dower was limited to one-third of the hus-
band’s real property, though there was some regional variation on this and other aspects of
dower law. See Marylynn Salmon, Women and the Law of Property in Early America
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 147–84.
162. See ibid., 88–89.
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husband-breadwinners, leaving their widows and children with little in the
way of tangible assets for support.163 For a host of reasons, in the first half
of the nineteenth century, dower began waning as a source of support even
for the women whose interests it had generally served.164 And the doctrine
of necessaries, never a particularly robust source of economic stability for
wives, did nothing to protect family assets—and married women and their
children—from a husband’s creditors, whether the husband was alive or
dead.
In the early nineteenth century, several other, newer legal devices
emerged that were intended, in part, to provide financial protection for a
much broader category of married and widowed women, while leaving
the basic principles of coverture intact. Several state legislatures enacted
intestacy provisions that gave widows an “elective share” of their deceased
husbands’ assets (both real and chattel property), rather than the traditional
promise of dower.165 From the 1830s onward, state legislatures also
enacted married women’s property acts. At this early stage, these acts
served as a kind of quasi-bankruptcy protection for families by shielding
a wife’s assets from her husband’s creditors.166 Married women’s property
acts thus made available to wives of all classes a measure of protection that,
until that time, had generally been available only to wealthy wives and
families that had the sophistication and means to create legally enforceable
separate estates.167 In the 1840s, many state legislatures enacted statutes
intended to facilitate the growth of private life insurance—the goal of
which was to protect widows and orphans from financial calamity—by
loosening coverture-based restrictions on a married woman’s ability to
contract for insurance on her husband’s life.168 In the same decade, state
163. See John Fabian Witt, The Accidental Republic: Crippled Workingmen, Destitute
Widows, and the Remaking of American Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2005), 23–26.
164. For a probing discussion of dower, its shortcomings as a means of securing widows’
financial stability, and dower reform statutes of the early twentieth century, see Dubler, “In
the Shadow of Marriage,” 1660–1700.
165. See Richard H. Chused, “Married Women’s Property Law: 1800–1850,”
Georgetown Law Journal 71 (1983): 1394–95.
166. See ibid., 1398–1404.
167. See ibid., 1410.
168. Sharon Ann Murphy, Investing in Life: Insurance in Antebellum America (Baltimore,
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 143–48. According to Murphy, “[m]en sup-
ported this moderate expansion of the rights of women because it allowed the paternalism
of the husband to extend from beyond the grave.” Ibid., 151. See also Mary L. Heen,
“From Coverture to Contract: Engendering Insurance on Lives,” Yale Journal of Law &
Feminism 23 (2011): 346–50; Susanna L. Blumenthal, “Death by His Own Hand”:
Accounting for Suicide in Nineteenth-Century Life Insurance Litigation, in Subjects of
Responsibility: Framing Personhood in Modern Bureaucracies, ed. Andrew Parker,
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legislatures also began to enact homestead exemption statutes, which pro-
tected the family home from creditors.169 These legal developments
expanded the social welfare function of marriage by protecting family
assets from the risk of industrial and financial calamity that seemed to
have become an inherent part of American life.
Animated by similar concerns, developments in tort law took the social
welfare function of marriage one step further by creating the possibility of
third-party liability for widows’ material support. As John Witt has shown,
starting in the 1840s, state legislatures enacted the first wrongful-death sta-
tutes that provided a cause of action for widows of men killed in acci-
dents.170 This new claim gradually replaced the common law rule that
had allowed the master to sue for the loss of services of a household depen-
dent, but had not allowed a dependent, including a widow, to sue for the
loss of support upon the husband-masters’ death.171 The wrongful-death
statutes that replaced the “loss of services” model were decidedly gender
based, as they provided a tort remedy for widows but not for widowers.172
Significantly, these statutes provided for widows not by shielding existing
family assets, but by requiring tortfeasors, especially industrial employers,
to pay damages. As a consequence, developments in tort law helped to
ensure a baseline financial security for a class of women for whom it
had generally provided very little: the widows of workingmen, for whom
legal protections of family assets were generally ineffectual, as such
women’s families had few, if any, assets to protect.173
There is no direct relationship or perfect parallel among these various
doctrinal developments, but all of them provided for the material interests
of a significantly larger class of women than had previously been the case,
Austin Sarat, and Martna Merrill Umphrey (New York: Fordham University Press, 2011):
98–144.
169. See Alison Morantz, “There’s No Place Like Home: Homestead Exemption and
Judicial Constructions of Family in Nineteenth-Century America,” Law & History Review
24 (2006): 252–54.
170. See John Fabian Witt, “From Loss of Services to Loss of Support: The Wrongful
Death Statutes, the Origins of Modern Tort Law, and the Making of the Nineteenth–
Century Family,” Law & Social Inquiry 25 (2000): 733–43.
171. Ibid., 732 (“[W]hat is remarkable about early actions to recover damages for wrong-
ful death is that . . . they all revolved around masters, husbands, or fathers suing to recover
damages for the loss of the services of a servant, wife, or minor child.”).
172. Ibid., 736–37.
173. A claim to dower was not particularly valuable to women whose husbands lacked
property. And unlike women of means, the widows of working men were also unlikely to
have any independent resources held in trust for their benefit, Salmon, Women and the
Law of Property, 83, or even to benefit from other emerging legal tools, such as the
married women’s property acts.
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and did so by attaching new legal rights and liabilities to marriage. It bears
emphasizing, moreover, that even as these various doctrines expanded the
legal rights of widows, they did not challenge coverture or its ideological
precepts concerning women’s status within the marital relationship or in
society. To the contrary, all of these doctrines and legal entitlements
built on and reinforced increasingly prevalent gender-based social norms:
men’s role as the breadwinner, and women’s role as the domestic helpmate.
Military widows’ pensions were part of this trend, and extended it one
step further. Changes to intestacy, property, contract, and tort affected
the liabilities and rights of private parties, but widows’ military pension
statutes recognized public liability for the support of a significant class
of widows. Unsurprisingly, some legislators were skeptical of the notion
that a widow’s legal dependence on a deceased veteran warranted public
liability for her support. As an initial matter, some legislators believed
that most military pension statutes were unconstitutional, including veter-
ans’ service-based pension statutes and widows’ pension statutes.174
When confronting such resistance, veterans seeking pensions during this
period could at least point to their service to the nation as a basis for the
country’s “debt” for their support.175 Widows had a more difficult task
because, at least according to some legislators, marriage to a military
man was, or should have been, sufficient to provide for a wife’s or widow’s
material needs. In 1843, Senator George McDuffie of South Carolina quer-
ied “upon what principle of policy or justice a claim could be set up by a
widow, . . . unless it were to be shown that she had participated in the
struggle, and had been subjected to the privations incident to the
time.”176 In the face of such logic, it was not enough for widows to assert
their legal dependency as justification for a pension. They needed to
174. See 31 Annals of Cong. 148 (1818) (statement of Senator William Smith) (contend-
ing that creation of veterans’ service-based pensions violated the “written Constitution”); and
Committee on Revolutionary Pensions, Revolutionary Pensions, H.R. Rep. No. 24–210, 3
(1836) (noting that the military pension system “is condemned by many, as unconstitutional
. . . .”). National legislators also frequently resorted to the Constitution as a basis for oppos-
ing private relief bills submitted by widows of high-ranking elected officials, such as Anna
Harrison, widow of President William Hamson. See, for example, Cong. Globe, 27th Cong.,
1st Sess. 104–5 (1841) (statement of Senator Thomas Benton); Cong. Globe, 27th Cong., 1st
Sess. 118 (1841) (statement of Senator Ambrose Sevier).
175. As both Jensen and Resch have demonstrated, many legislators argued that military
service alone was not a sufficient basis for a pension. For searching discussions of the veter-
ans’ arguments––and resistance to those arguments––see Jensen, Patriots, 63–109, and
Resch, Suffering Soldiers, 84–118.
176. Cong. Globe, 27th Cong., 3rd Sess. 388 (1843). See also sources cited in above
note 147.
Law and History Review, February 201342
explain how their role as domestic helpmate of a man who served the
country in battle warranted government support.
This may explain why, even as widows drew attention to their husbands’
services as a basis for their claims, they also used their petitions to provide
legislators with firsthand testimonies of women’s own services to country
and husband, and of the poverty that frequently befell widows. We see this
in the petitions of relatively high-status widows, such as the New England
and New Jersey widows, which emphasized the widows’ services, and it
resonates throughout the pension petitions of common women. Widows
seeking pensions often noted the service they performed and the costs
they incurred raising their children. The plea that Congress should “enable
the mothers to feed and educate their children”177 was commonplace in
petitions submitted by younger widows, but older widows also reasoned
that their earlier services as mothers justified a widow’s pension in old
age. Two decades after her husband’s death in the War of 1812,
Thankful Randall sought his pension, in part on the grounds that she
had born “the expense of bringing up the children, and she is meritoriously
entitled to [her deceased husband’s] half-pay.”178 Similarly, in 1840,
Frances Barr petitioned Congress for “remuneration,” explaining “that
her late husband was a soldier in the late war with Great Britain, and during
his absence of three years and seven months, she was compelled to support
four children by her own labor.”179 And at 72 years of age, Hannah
Duboise petitioned Congress, explaining that after her husband died in the
War of 1812 she had supported her two small children, but now she “cannot
support herself any longer, and asks for relief from her country.”180 Citing a
supporting declaration from her town’s overseer of the poor, the committee
recommended that Congress grant Duboise’s request.181
Widows—those with and without children—also did not hesitate to
argue that their poverty was caused by women’s particular vulnerabilities
in and out of marriage. In an 1824 petition, Nancy Lancy was candid
about women’s dependency on their husbands for financial support, and
177. Committee of Claims, Major Dade, et al.––Pensions to Widows and Children, H.R.
Rep. No. 24–415, 1 (1836).
178. Committee on Invalid Pensions, Mem[orandum] in Case of Thankful Randall, H.R.
Rep. No. 29, NARA, Records of the House of Representatives, RG 233, 24th Congress,
Committee Papers––Committee on Invalid Pensions, Hr27a-G9.1 (file of Issac Pishon);
see also Committee on Invalid Pensions, Thankful Randall, H.R. Rep. No. 23–89 (1835).
179. Journal of the House of Representatives 939 (26th Cong., 1st Sess. 1840).
180. Committee on Invalid Pensions, Widow Hannah Duboise, H.R. Rep. No. 28–482
(1844).
181. Ibid.
“Petitions Without Number” 43
widows’ limited options for self-support. Lancy’s husband had died in the
War of 1812. She was awarded a pension in 1816, which was then
extended in 1819.182 In the early 1820s, anticipating the expiration of
her pension, and “intirely ignorant that it would be extended a second
period, she married a man who she calculated would support her.”183
Unfortunately for Lancy, he was “soon after lost at sea, having lived
with your petitioner only eight days. She is now left depressed with pov-
erty, and afflicted with very slender health, and is, she humbly hopes, as
much an object of the protecting care of the Government, as when her
first husband fell in defending his country’s flag.”184
Such pathetic pleas drew on the contemporary trope of the “poor
widow” and became part of the generic convention of the widows’ petition.
But the commonplace nature of widows’ pleas of poverty should not
diminish their significance. In a world in which military widows’ pensions
traditionally had been a class-salient form of reward for widows of officers
presumptively engaged in heroic service, widows’ pleas of poverty collec-
tively reflected and informed a new way of reasoning about widows’ enti-
tlement to government relief, and about widows’ particular vulnerability to
poverty. In this respect, widows’ pension petitions helped prompt a shift
from treating military widows’ pensions as “inducements” for heroic
182. File of Nancy Lancy, NARA, Records of the Department of Veterans Affairs, RG 15,
Old Wars Pension Files, Widow’s File 688, Pension Certificate, March 4, 1816; ibid.,
Petition of Nancy Lancy, March 1, 1824. Congress struggled to fashion a pension system
that took account of the plight of the re-widowed. For the elderly widows of the
Revolutionary War, Congress in 1837 softened the remarriage bar to pensions and allowed
pensions for widows of veterans who had remarried but found themselves widowed a second
(or third) time. See Act of March 3, 1837, ch. 42, § 1, 5 Stat. 187, 187 (1837). Congress
sometimes used private acts to circumvent similar limitations on traditional war widows’
pensions. For example, prior to remarrying, the widow of Robert Brice had received a pen-
sion for 10 years. Her pension ceased when she married Aaron Bowen, but when Bowen
died in 1848, Nancy Bowen petitioned Congress for a pension, as she had been left “in a
destitute and helpless situation, aged, infirm, and childless.” The Senate Committee on
Pensions found that “it is just and proper in cases like this, where the widow has been
left in a destitute and helpless condition, to renew the pension.” Committee on Pensions,
S. Rep. No. 32–93 (1852) (report on petition of Nancy Bowen). A later report on
Bowen’s petition discussed other similarly situated widows and explained that “this class
of petitioners . . . ha[s] been, and will continue to be, provided for by special acts of
Congress.” See Committee on Pensions, S. Rep. No. 33–242 (1854) (report on the petition
of Nancy Bowen). Despite these assertions many traditional war widows who remarried and
were re-widowed found themselves unable to convince the Pension Office that they should
be re-pensioned. See sources in note 77.
183. File of Nancy Lancy, NARA, Records of the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, RG
15, Old Wars Pension Files, Widow’s File 688, Petition of Nancy Lancy, March 1, 1824.
184. Ibid.
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military service to “charity . . . extended to the bereaved widow[s].”185
That shift was significant in its own right, as it reflected an emerging
way of reasoning about poverty as a legitimate basis for public expenditure
and, as a consequence, helped precipitate the extension of widows’ pen-
sions to common women.
We hear the resonance of common women’s petitions in legislative
debates held in 1818, during a period of substantial leveling and expansion
of traditional war widows’ pensions.186 “Equality, in the contributions for
the public service, is one of the first principles of our Government,”
explained Representative (and future President) William Harrison of
Ohio in support of a bill that would have extended the duration of War
of 1812 widows’ pensions.187 “The public burdens are to fall equally
upon all in proportion to their means. No individual, and no family, are
to furnish more than their just share, either of money or of personal service,
without an equivalent.”188 To underscore this point, Harrison imagined a
horde of petitioning widows marching on Washington, children in tow:
Suppose the many hundred widows and orphans, the relicts of the late war,
were to be brought before us . . . . The thing cannot be–but I beg gentlemen to
give some scope to their imaginations, and persuade themselves that they
really see it. Here a venerable matron, followed by a large family of children;
there, another, in the full bloom of beauty, a widow through choice and under
a sacred vow that the hero who had once filled her arms should never be sup-
plied by another; the lovely boy she holds by the hand was an orphan before
he saw the light . . . .189
Earlier that year, Representative Richard Johnson of Kentucky had
employed a similar rhetorical device in support of a bill that would have
extended the duration of an existing widows’ pension statute. “Bring this
unfortunate groupe in review before us; let the image, not of imaginary
185. Committee on Pensions and Revolutionary Claims, Petition Granted to the Widow of
a Captain in the Army Who Died in Service, H.R. Rep. No. 14–285 (1816) (report on the
petition of Elizabeth Morgan).
186. See, for example, Act of March 4, 1814, ch. 20, § 2, 2 Stat. 103, 103–4 (granting
pensions to widows of any “officer, seaman, or marine” of the United States navy who
“shall die . . . by reason of a wound received in the line of his duty”); Act of April 16,
1818, ch. 65, § 1, 3 Stat. 427, 427–78 (granting 5-year extension of pensions awarded to
widows pursuant to the Act of March 4, 1814); Act of April 20, 1818, ch. 101, §§ 1–2, 3
Stat. 459, 459 (granting 5-year half-pay pensions to widows of militia who “prosecut[ed]
the war against the Seminole tribe of Indians”); and Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 60, 3 Stat.
502, 502 (granting 5-year extension of pensions awarded to widows of “officers, seamen,
and marines” killed in the War of 1812).
187. 33 Annals of Cong. 378 (1818).
188. Ibid.
189. Ibid., 382–83.
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but of real bereavement, and consequent distress, be drawn in its full mag-
nitude before our eyes. Behold fourteen hundred and fifty-four weeping
widows, and more than a thousand helpless orphans, in all the despon-
dency of wo . . . .” 190 Johnson then provocatively suggested that the “des-
titute female, the widow, would have to languish and die, or, by seeking
the bounty of the world, must subject herself to insults, and, in many
cases it would lead to more disastrous consequences.”191
For Johnson and Harrison, the injustice of the current system lay not
only in the failure to provide for widows whose husbands had “sacrificed
their all” to the country, and who were frequently left in pinching poverty.
The system already pensioned widows of officers, or, worse, allowed men
of means to escape military service entirely, creating a system of privileged
citizenship for wealthy men and their families that was decidedly unrepu-
blican. The “rich married man,” explained Harrison, “is allowed to furnish
a substitute—the poor married man, unable to hire one, is obliged when
called upon to serve in person. As the poor, then, fight all your battles,
which is, perhaps, unavoidable, it is just and right the consequences of
their service should fall as lightly as possible on their families.”192
Harrison’s speech was part of an ongoing debate over the propriety of
the military pension system more generally. Efforts to expand the federal
pension system frequently met with the objection that government-funded
relief was inappropriate in a republic. Opponents argued that military pen-
sions would lead to a class of aristocratic placemen in America, and in the
next breath said that the military pension looked too much like government
charity for the poor. They frequently invoked the British pension and poor
law systems in debates over widows’ pensions. Representative Eldred
Simkins of South Carolina opposed expansion of the pensions afforded tra-
ditional war widows, warning that America would go the way of the
motherland: “The history of England . . . afforded a commentary on
such policy; by the operation of her poor law and her pension system,
she had slided into an expense so great that even the air they breathed
and the light of heaven, were become subject to taxation.”193
190. 31 Annals of Cong. 873 (1818).
191. Ibid., 874.
192. 33 Annals of Cong. 378–79 (1818).
193. Ibid., 396. See also 31 Annals of Cong. 150 (1818) (statement of Senator William
Smith) (“All the despotisms of Europe have had their foundations in a claim to military
merit. All their pensions and places originated in it.”); ibid., 156 (statement of Senator
Nathaniel Macon) (“[The opinion that Republics are ungrateful] has been promulgated by
the flatterers and sycophants of kings and despots, to become their favorites and pensioners,
to live sumptuously on their folly or wickedness, or both, on the profits of the labor of
those who were more virtuous and better than themselves. The opinion is founded in idleness
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For Harrison, this critique missed a more striking comparison: to the
extent that America’s military pension system treated citizens and families
differently based on their class-salient status, it already resembled the des-
potic pension regimes of Europe. There could be no “analogy between [the
pension system] of this Government and of the Governments of Europe,”
Harrison contended, “the one being of moderate extent, and for actual ser-
vices, the other of enormous extent, and bestowed on the principle of
favoritism merely.” Here, he said, were individuals “who have contributed
their all to the service of the country—the parent who supported and edu-
cated the child; the husband on whom the wife depended for protection and
subsistence.”194 Echoing the insistence that “equal claims or sacrifices
should meet with equal rewards,” Representative Henry Southard of
New Jersey explained that “in monarchal and despotic Governments, injus-
tice and oppression may answer; but in a Republic, a different line of con-
duct must be pursued.” If the “interest of despots is . . . by oppression to
extort obedience and command their services . . . . our interest is to be just
and liberal to that class of citizens upon whom the liberty and indepen-
dence of their country so much depend.”195 In the minds of pro-pension
legislators, equalization of military widows’ pensions followed from
elementary republican principles.
These legislators’ arguments in favor of expanding widows’ pensions to
include widows of non-officers were surely tied to a larger set of claims
concerning men’s status and the rights of the citizen-soldier in the wake
of the War of 1812. Most notably, the War of 1812 served as a crucial
stimulus for the movement for manhood suffrage among white men who
were mustered into the militia, as the very process of being mustered
gave them both opportunity and special cause to protest their disenfranch-
isement.196 In addition, in the aftermath of that war, Revolutionary War
veterans agitated successfully for the expansion of veterans’ service-based
and hatred to free Governments, where every man ought live by the sweat of his own
brow . . . .”); Cong. Globe, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1841) (statement of Representative
Thomas Gilmer) (“It ought to be remembered by every citizen of a free Republic, that,
under our forms of Government, while the soldier hazarded his life and spent his time or his
fortune for the public good, he could look to none of those rewards which, under European
Governments, were so frequently bestowed as marks of public honor.”); and source cited in
note 222.
194. 33 Annals of Cong. 394 (1818).
195. 31 Annals of Cong. 875 (1818).
196. J. R. Pole, Political Representation in England and the Origins of the American
Republic (London: Macmillan, 1966), 206–9; and Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote:
The Contested History of Democracy in the United States (New York: Basic Books,
2000), 31.
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pensions.197 In that effort, the image of the citizen-soldier had been suc-
cessfully harnessed by organized veterans’ groups and individuals to
secure service-based pensions for Revolutionary War veterans of all
ranks, affirming the centrality of military service as a hallmark of full, par-
ticipatory citizenship.198 The growth of widows’ pensions similarly helped
solidify non-elite men’s status as husbands and citizens, as widows’ pen-
sions indirectly rewarded all married men who had served the nation.199
In this regard, widows’ pension statutes were part of a shift, albeit limited,
toward democratization of men’s citizenship rights during the “era of the
common man.”200
It would be wrongheaded, however, to understand widows’ pension sta-
tutes only in terms of what they signaled concerning men’s status.
Widows’ pension petitions pushed Congress to acknowledge common
women’s particular contributions and vulnerabilities as wives and widows
with financial support from the federal coffers. And, as discussed above,
the petitions did so by drawing on contemporary discourses of domesticity.
In this regard, it comes as little surprise that the two most significant
widows’ pension statutes were enacted in the 1830s, as the concept of
domesticity was crystallizing in various cultural forms. Women had long
been understood as the keepers of the hearth, but the notion that women
possessed special traits and talents that suited them for homemaking and
child rearing took on new force and significance as it was refined and
reproduced in sermons, magazines, advice books, novels, and poems.201
A woman’s highest and most appropriate calling was in the home, where
she should nurture and instruct her children and exert moral and religious
197. See Jensen, Patriots, 66–79; Resch, Suffering Soldiers, 84–118.
198. See Resch, Suffering Soldiers, 2–3.
199. It is relevant to note that the first service-based pension statute for Revolutionary War
widows, enacted in 1836, technically extended the pensions that had been awarded to
Revolutionary War veterans to their widows. See discussion in note 24.
200. Characterization of the Jacksonian period as the “era of the common man” was sig-
nificantly discredited by historians in the 1960s and 1970s. See, for example, Edward
Pessen, Jacksonian America: Society, Personality, and Politics (Champaign: University of
Illinois Press, 1969). More recent work by Sean Wilentz has revitalized interest in the
Jacksonian period, and the conviction that it was marked by distinctive “democratic”
changes in national and local politics. See Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American
Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln (New York: Norton, 2005); see also Jeffrey L. Pasley,
“Minnows, Spies, and Aristocrats: The Social Crisis of Congress in the Age of Martin
Van Buren,” Journal of the Early Republic 27 (2007): 599–653. One need not resolve
this debate to recognize that claims to egalitarianism––and opposition to values associated
with aristocracy––were a salient feature of political discourse during the period. Debates
over widows’ pension petitions suggest that the creation and expansion of widows’ pensions
was in part fueled, or at least justified, by “democratic” values of the era.
201. See Cott, The Bonds of Womanhood, 7–9.
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influence on all those residing in the household.202 Debates over widows’
pensions therefore reveal that, although such beliefs concerning women’s
inherent capacities were routinely used to justify women’s exclusion
from direct political participation, they were also used to enhance widows’
claims to public material support. In this respect, women’s inclusion in,
and exclusion from, matters of public concern shared the same ideological
foundation.
It is worth underscoring, moreover, that the growth of widows’ pensions
demonstrates that by the 1830s, domesticity was being recognized and
reified as a concept that was important, not just for women of the upper
and middle classes, but for women across the socioeconomic spectrum.203
At a time when judges and legislators were beginning to recognize and
exploit the social welfare function of marriage for a substantially larger
set of women in other areas of law,204 widows’ pension petitions sounded
the horn of common women’s domestic contributions, dependency, and
need. Through those petitions, women’s understanding of their rights as
wives were brought to bear on the legislative process, creating a feedback
loop between women and national legislators. Whether through firsthand
knowledge or newspaper reports, women such as Catharine Barr knew
about other widows who had received pensions: both poor widows like
herself and wealthy widows like Susan Decatur.205 Barr used that knowl-
edge to frame her claim, defending the merits of her view that poverty and
dependency, not rank or status, were proper reasons to allocate public
monies for military widows’ support. Others like her did the same in
their petitions to Congress, thus serving as a conduit for a new way of
understanding the purpose and function of military widows’ pensions,
and helping to entrench marriage as a national institution.
C. Leveling Down: Disestablishing Class-Salient Widows’ Pensions
While actual petitions of widows, along with visions of hordes of impover-
ished widows arriving in Washington, prompted legislators to reason about
the poverty of a substantial class of women as a problem that should be
addressed by the national government, reactions against aristocratic privi-
lege also played a central role in shaping and equalizing the widows’ pen-
sion system. If any widow’s petition bore the imprint of the “wild
202. Ibid., 8.
203. See Carl Degler, At Odds: Women and the Family in America from the Revolution to
the Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 111–43 (observing the salience of
the concept of domesticity even among lower-class women).
204. See discussion accompanying notes 165–73.
205. See note 97.
“Petitions Without Number” 49
profusion and extravagance” of Europe, it was Susan Decatur’s.206
Although she was ultimately successful in obtaining private relief from
Congress, many legislators resisted her petitions precisely because her
claim was cut from the cloth of Old World privilege and entitlement.
Decatur’s extraordinary legal saga is, therefore, significant as a legal arti-
fact, not only because her case resulted in a significant Supreme Court
opinion concerning mandamus,207 but because her petitions to Congress,
and the petitions of women like her, prompted reconsideration of
whether—and, if so, how—the federal government should use marriage
as a basis for public entitlements.
Decatur’s petitions to Congress leave little doubt that her claim to an
entitlement was founded on a class-salient understanding of widows’
legal rights. Although Decatur pled poverty, the papers submitted with
her claim spoke of Stephen’s heroism in Tripoli—“admirable for the chi-
valry of its conception, and the brilliant and decisive manner of its
execution”—and bore endorsements of Decatur’s powerful connections
in Washington, D.C.208
Such patronage gave Decatur access to legislators that very few other
widows enjoyed, and those connections undoubtedly secured the votes
of some legislators, but Decatur’s bald resort to connections outraged the
sensibilities of others. In 1834, Representative Thomas Chilton of
Kentucky spoke about Decatur’s petition, which by that point had been
before Congress in various forms for 9 years. Chilton complained that
Congress was being called upon to “appropriate an enormous sum” to
benefit “a lady, having, as I understand, a large real estate in this city
[and] not a child on earth to provide for,” while “countless hosts of widows
were left, with crowds of helpless children around them in double orpha-
nage, for whom no provision has ever yet been made.” These women,
Chilton observed, would have little chance of securing a pension, or
even obtaining acknowledgement of their petition, from Congress:
Suppose, sir, that some poor and obscure woman should come here, who has
eight or ten children, in the rags of poverty, and, perhaps, without even bread
to eat? Suppose she should say to Congress—“Gentlemen, my husband, the
father of these suffering children, left his humble fireside and his home—he
left me and these. He went forth and fought your battles. . . . Give me and my
children thirty thousand dollars.”What would be the reply? Ah me! How few
the eloquent tongues that would respond, Here take it, it is yours. And should
206. The phrase is Representative Harrison’s. See 33 Annals of Cong. 377 (1818).
207. See Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. 497 (1840).
208. Committee on Naval Affairs, On the Claim of Mrs. Susan Decatur, H.R. Rep. No.
19–281 (1826). See sources cited in note 55.
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she even ask, more modestly, for one thousand, or five hundred—the reply
would be, in substance, “Depart, for we know you not.”. . . An officer, having
a great name, has only to demand and receive his thousands, or his tens of
thousands; while the poor soldier . . . . is forgotten.209
Chilton’s disillusionment with Decatur’s case was of a particular moment:
In 1834 Congress was actively considering significant expansion of the
demographic reach of widows’ pensions. But antipathy to Decatur’s
quest for a pension was enduring, re-emerging in legislative debates at
different junctures. In 1856, for example, Senator Clement Claiborne
Clay of Alabama objected to Decatur’s claim. “There are petitions without
number,” he exclaimed, referring to the unsatisfied claims of other widows,
and then noted that his “recollection is that [Decatur] has already been the
recipient of more bounties from this Government than the widow of any
other officer of our Navy.”210
In Decatur’s case, the backlash against privilege and private bills
appears to have played an unusually direct role in shaping the public
law. When Decatur submitted her first petition, in 1825, private and public
acts that provided for officers’ widows only were giving way to a new,
more egalitarian understanding of military widows’ pensions that would
help precipitate the enactment of two far-reaching general widows’ pension
statutes in 1836.211 Seen in light of this leveling trend, it was not simply a
coincidence that on the same day that Congress finally enacted a private
pension act for Susan Decatur—March 3, 1837—it also enacted the extra-
ordinarily broad general pension statute, appropriately titled “An Act for
the More Equitable Administration of the Navy Pension Fund.”212 This
general pension statute for navy widows not only reached widows of the
rank-and-file, but also awarded lifetime pensions—retroactively and with
arrears—to all navy widows whose husbands had “died while in ser-
vice,”213 rather than “by reason of wounds received in the line of duty,”
as was the case with most traditional war widows’ pension statutes.214
209. 10 Reg. Deb. 3820–21 (1834).
210. Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 1582 (1856). Impatience with Decatur’s claim
was palpable even in discussions of parliamentary procedure. Objecting to a motion to
take up Decatur’s bill out of order under Senate rules, Senator Richard Brodhead of
Pennsylvania, former Chairman of the House Committee on Revolutionary Pensions, sniped,
“I hope we shall not go beyond one o’clock with this bill for the relief of Mrs. Susan
Decatur. I have heard a great deal of Mrs. Susan Decatur since I have been in Congress
for the last ten years.” Ibid., 1600.
211. See The First System of Public Marriage–Based Entitlements (text section I).
212. Act of March 3, 1837, ch. 38, § 1, 5 Stat. 180, 180.
213. Ibid.
214. Cong. Globe, 26th Cong., 2nd Sess. App. 81 (1840) (statement of Representative
Charles Shepard) (explaining that by the 1837 Act “a new doctrine was slipped into the
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The extraordinary generosity of the March 3, 1837 act is best understood
as part of a direct reaction to Congress’s private act for Decatur. Although
no record of the legislative debate for the 1837 statute seems to have sur-
vived,215 debates held just 3 years later, as Congress contemplated its
repeal, are telling. The broad scope of the act had nearly bankrupted the
navy pension fund. As the House considered the extremely unusual step
of repealing a widows’ pension statute,216 it charged Representative
Charles Shepard of North Carolina with determining why Congress had
enacted such a generous statute in the first place. His investigation led
him to Decatur. Shepard explained that “a portion of the [navy pension]
fund had been given to Mrs. Decatur by a special act, and therefore it
was thought reasonable to invite other widows and orphans to partake of
what had been sacredly devoted to a different purpose.”217 In other
words, in a reaction to the generous relief awarded to Decatur by private
act, Congress had attempted to secure a “more equitable administration
of the navy pension fund”218 by passing a general pension law that entitled
an enormous class of navy widows to pensions on the same terms as those
provided for Decatur. Because Stephen Decatur had not died of battle
wounds, but had been in the naval service when he died, the public act
also accommodated widows whose husbands had “died while in service.”
In addition, like Susan Decatur’s private act, the general pension statute
awarded pensions retroactively to the date of the husband’s death.
Congress’s resistance to special treatment of high-status widows like
Decatur led it to significantly expand the general pension laws to reach
all navy widows on the same terms.
The March 3, 1837 legislation is only one example of how national law-
makers’ suspicion of patrician widows’ claims for private relief led to a
statute-book; it gave pensions to the widows, and, if no widows, to the children of officers,
seamen, and marines, ‘who have died or may hereafter die in the naval service.’ However
unjust or impolitic previous acts had been, they were not complained of, because the
benefit accrued to the relatives of such as ‘were killed, or died by reason of wounds received
in the line of duty’—but now if a sailor should die from an ordinary disease, or the consti-
tution of an officer be broken down by dissipation, their widows and children are entitled to
the same pensions as those of the men who fall in battle.”).
215. Ibid., 80 (statement of Representative Charles Shepard) (observing that the 1837 Act
was “not discussed, [and] the yeas and nays were not taken on its package”).
216. To my knowledge, in the early nineteenth century Congress repealed a widows’ pen-
sion statute on only one other occasion: in 1824, it repealed an 1817 statute that expanded
pension eligibility to widows whose husbands had died of disease while in the line of duty.
See Act of January 22, 1824, ch 15, § 2, 4 Stat. 4, 4 (repealing Act of March 3, 1817, ch. 60,
3 Stat. 373).
217. Cong. Globe, 26th Cong., 2d Sess. App. 80 (1840).
218. Act of March 3, 1837, ch. 38, § 1, 5 Stat. 180.
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leveling up of military widows’ pensions more generally.219 The
Congressional Globe provides a full account of the lengthy debates over
a petition submitted by the widow of President Harrison, a man who had
spent his early days in Congress advocating for the equalization of
widows’ pensions. Upon her husband’s untimely death, Anna Harrison
petitioned Congress for a pension of $25,000.220 Harrison’s petition,
which unfortunately for her was presented at the same time that the legis-
lators were considering the repeal of the overly generous act of March 3,
1837, became another lightning rod for debate concerning the propriety
and scope of pensions for patrician widows.221
Some senators used the debate over Harrison’s petition as an opportunity
to criticize the widows’ military pension system more generally, but the
great weight of the concern was that pensions awarded to elite widows
like Anna Harrison smelled of aristocratic pretension and privilege.
During the floor debate, Senator Thomas Benton of Missouri sought to
“exemplify the evils of [a] system of civil pensions, by showing what it
had produced in England” by reading off a long list of well-known place-
men and place-ladies who lived off the public treasury.222 Senator Perry
Smith of Connecticut conceded that Harrison was a “worthy lady,” but
argued that were an inquiry made, “it would be found that she had a better
property than many that are considered wealthy in the United States.” He
summarized what by then appeared to be the prevailing view of Congress:
“Was not the sympathy of Congress more appropriately due to the widows
219. As early as 1815, the Annals of Congress contains a brief summary of a “debate . . .
of some interest” concerning a pension petition brought by the widow of Vice President
Elbridge Gerry. “The general principle asserted by those opposed to the pension was the
impropriety of setting a precedent of pensions for civil services, which would entail on
the United States the evils so grievously felt in despotic Governments, from the same
source.” 28 Annals of Cong. 1173 (February 20, 1815). Not all petitions submitted by
widows of famous men were denied. For example, although a petition submitted by
Alexander Hamilton’s widow Elizabeth in 1810 was initially rejected, she was eventually
granted 5 years of back pay allegedly owed her husband. See Committee on Pensions and
Revolutionary Claims, Claim of the Widow of Colonel Alexander Hamilton for
Commutation, H.R. Rep. No. 14–299 (1816). However, Elizabeth did not receive a pension
per se until 1838, when she became entitled to a service–based widows’ pension under a law
of general applicability, the Act of July 4, 1836. See File of Elizabeth Hamilton, NARA,
Records of the Department of Veterans Affairs, RG 15, Series M804, W 13402, Pension
Office Summary of Record.
220. See Cong. Globe, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (1841).
221. Debates over Harrison’s pension petitions yielded at least 22 pages in the very small
font of the Congressional Globe. See Cong. Globe, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 67–70; 73–77;
104–11; 116–21 (1841); and Cong. Globe, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 64; 169–70 (1841).
222. Cong. Globe, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 105 (1841).
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and orphans of those who had equal claims, and who were left in poverty
and destitution?”223 Anna Harrison’s petition was denied.
The individual petitions filed by widows of high-ranking officers and
prominent public servants undoubtedly received more attention from legis-
lators than the individual petitions of common women, but in the longer
run congressional debates over their merits likely benefited the Catharine
Barrs of the world rather than the Decaturs or Harrisons. Petitions sub-
mitted by the widows of high-ranking men often drew attention to widows’
claims while also highlighting the inequalities of the inherited practice of
providing for the widows of officers only, and of the unrepublican dangers
of a system of selective, ad hoc entitlements. At a time when egalitarianism
was a frequently celebrated, if not necessarily practiced, social and political
virtue,224 patrician women’s pension petitions tended to push Congress to
enact more egalitarian, general widows’ pension laws, such as the statutes
enacted in March and July of 1836 and the raft of subsequent statutes that
dramatically expanded the reach of military widows’ pensions over the
subsequent decades.225
IV. Widows’ Petitions and the Origins of Marriage-Based Entitlements
In urging that we must recognize widows’ petitions as a crucial factor in
the development of early nineteenth-century military widows’ pensions,
the goal is neither to overstate the significance of women’s petitions, nor
to underplay the significance of other political and cultural forces that
influenced legislators’ voting practices. Other aspects of the political pro-
cess are crucial to understanding why the widows’ pension system evolved
as it did, when it did. American political development scholars have rightly
trained our attention on the importance of institutional and political factors
in shaping law and policy. Most notably, of course, Theda Skocpol’s path-
breaking analysis of late nineteenth-century military pensions has heigh-
tened our attentiveness to how politics shapes policy, particularly with
223. Ibid., 108.
224. Celebration of social and political equality is often associated with the Jacksonian
period, although any robust claims to actual socioeconomic and political equality during
that period were put to rest by Edward Pessen over four decades ago. See Pessen,
Jacksonian America, 39–58. One certainly does not find evidence that pro-pension legis-
lators sought to secure conditions of social or economic equality for struggling widows.
Nevertheless, national legislators’ resistance to class-salient widows’ pensions are marked
by a distinctive distrust of aristocratic entitlement that was undoubtedly informed by a com-
mitment, however limited, to a more egalitarian approach to entitlements.
225. See notes 22–36 and accompanying text.
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respect to social provision.226 Surely, the growth of widows’ pensions in
the early nineteenth century can in part be explained in such terms.
Treasury surpluses and the related tariff debates helped fuel the develop-
ment of military pensions227 (although it is notable that many public law
widows’ pension statutes were enacted during periods of low reserves).
And, undoubtedly, the administrative capacity to respond to widows’
claims was a necessary condition of making broad-scale pensions anything
more than an empty promise.228 Nor should we be naïve about the rhetori-
cal nature of congressional debate. Legislators responded to widows’ peti-
tions for a host of reasons, some of which were no doubt completely
unrelated to their proclaimed sympathy for the financial distress of the
women whose petitions they considered.
But in our rush to find a causal explanation in political processes and
institutional conditions that, at first blush, appear to be removed from the
lives of everyday women of the early nineteenth century, we should not
overlook the central role of widows’ petitioning efforts in the development
of military widows’ pensions. Widows’ pension petitions were not window
dressing for larger political and institutional processes; they were an inte-
gral part of the political and institutional processes that brought the first
centralized, broad-scale system of public marriage-based entitlements
into being. As demonstrated by the string of widows’ petitions that
prompted the enactment of the watershed statutes of 1836, the petition
was the legal and political tool that widows used to put their needs—as
individuals, but with shared experiences—on the legislative agenda.
National legislators gradually responded to widows’ requests for pensions,
and they did so not just for widows of the middle and upper classes, but for
widows of all classes. In short, the widows’ pension petitions helped render
Catharine Barr’s spirited proclamation concerning widows’ pensions—“[i]t
is no more than right that our Country should allow us that mite for our
own Exclusive use”229—intelligible to her and women like her, and intel-
ligible to men in Congress.
Recognition of the salience of women’s petitions in the development of
broad-scale marriage-based entitlements helps us to situate the legal claims
of women like Decatur and Barr and Tenney on the spectrum of early
226. See Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers.
227. See Jensen, Patriots, 110–22. Notably, in her searching and careful analysis of the
emergence of veterans’ pensions in the early nineteenth century, Jensen finds that party poli-
tics did not play a significant role in their development. Ibid., 110.
228. See Collins, “Administering Marriage.”
229. File of Catharine Davidson, NARA, Records of the Department of Veterans’ Affairs,
RG 15, Old Wars Pension Files, Widow’s File 322, Catharine Barr to Commissioner of
Pensions, June 20, 1858.
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nineteenth-century women’s legal and political activities. Historians have
done much over the last three decades to illuminate the many ways in
which, cultural and political barriers notwithstanding, women played sig-
nificant roles in public life in the early nineteenth century. At the local,
state, and national levels of government, women engaged in a range of pol-
itical processes and rituals, and were deeply involved in party politics and,
perhaps especially, social activism.230 In these capacities, women fre-
quently exploited contemporary gender ideology—and, particularly, the
belief in women’s special moral status as mothers—in crafting arguments
for a particular course of community or government action.
In a similar fashion, widows’ pension petitions functioned as an impor-
tant vehicle for reinforcing and exploiting gender-based sociopolitical roles
that by the 1830s were deeply rooted in political and cultural discourse:
women’s important, but dependent, function as domestic helpmates, and
men’s idealized status as wage earners and citizen-soldiers. Accordingly,
widows seeking pensions rarely challenged the gendered values of antebel-
lum society. For example, women did not generally petition for pensions
based on their direct services as nurses or camp aides. Although at least
one woman sought a pension in part based on her service as a nurse in
the Revolutionary War, her claim was rejected by legislators and drowned
out by the petitions of women seeking support on the basis of their status
as widows.231 Similarly, although there were a few known instances of
women cross-dressing and enlisting in the military, there was no general
sense among women, or even among proto-feminists of the period, that
women should be able to serve in the military and benefit from the
230. See, for example, Ronald J. Zboray and Mary Saracino Zboray, Voices Without
Votes: Women and Politics in Antebellum New England (Lebanon: University of New
Hampshire Press, 2010); Zagarri, Revolutionary Backlash; Portnoy, Their Right to Speak;
Allgor, Parlor Politics; Kierner, Beyond the Household; Ryan, Women in Public, 19–42,
130–41; Varon, We Mean to Be Counted; John F. Marszalek, The Petticoat Affair:
Manners, Mutiny, and Sex in Andrew Jackson’s White House (New York: Free Press,
1997); and Ginzberg, “‘Moral Suasion Is Moral Balderdash’”.
231. See, for example, Committee of Claims, Martha Twist, H.R. Rep. No. 28–29
(January 11, 1845). Martha Twist was the widow of Stephen Twist, who, she observed,
“was in the service of the United States for about the period of fifty years.” But Martha
also based her pension claim on the fact that “she herself was . . . attached to the army
for about the same length of time in the capacity of a nurse and laundress and therefore
asks that she may receive such assistance as will prove adequate to support her during the
rest of her life.” The Committee recommended against the pension, noting that “[t]he valu-
able services of the petitioner are not called into question” but that “they cannot consent to
establish a precedent that will open a new class of cases to be adjusted and paid at the treas-
ury.” Ibid.
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entitlements granted to men on the basis of such service.232 Instead,
widows seeking pensions reasoned from and within traditional gender
norms, and employed the petition in a way that harnessed those norms
to secure material security for themselves and their families.
In this regard, widows’ claims to pensions based on women’s traditional
services as wives and mothers resonated with the contemporary claims of
women who sought compensation for household labor. As Reva Siegel has
chronicled, in the early nineteenth century women’s rights activists advo-
cated for joint property rights in marriage—a significant departure from the
regime of coverture, in which nearly all that was hers became his upon
marriage, including any income generated by her domestic labor.233
Albeit unsuccessful, women advocating for joint property rights sought
recognition of wives’ contributions to the household economy through
their substantial efforts: cooking, gardening, cleaning, sewing, keeping
boarders, and, especially, child rearing.234 Although certainly progressive
in their time, as Siegel demonstrates, women urging compensation for
wives’ domestic services did not challenge the gendered divisions of
labor in the family, and they reasoned quite comfortably within a “separate
spheres” tradition.235 Nevertheless, by claiming a right to wages for house-
hold labor, they were undoubtedly seeking rights as women, or, as we
would say today, women’s rights.
More idiosyncratically, a woman like Catharine Barr might also have
found a kindred spirit in Elizabeth Ware Packard, who in the 1860s pub-
licly fought against her husband’s despotic and abusive treatment.236 As
Hendrik Hartog explains in a careful reconstruction of Packard’s ordeal,
her husband had committed her to an asylum, as he was authorized to
do under the law, because Packard insisted on publicly declaring her
views on spiritualism, despite the admonitions of her Calvinist minister-
232. The exceptions, although famous, prove the rule. For example, Deborah Sampson
(later Gannett) enlisted in the Fourth Massachusetts Regiment in 1781 as “Robert
Shurtleff.” She fought in several engagements and was honorably discharged after she
was discovered to be a woman. She was pensioned by the state of Massachusetts in the
1790s and by Congress in 1805. For a rich account of Deborah Sampson Gannett’s pursuit
of a pension, see Alfred F. Young, Masquerade: The Life and Times of Deborah Sampson,
Continental Soldier (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004). Her husband was granted a pen-
sion by Congress for her service in 1837. See Committee on Revolutionary Pensions,
Benjamin Gannett, H.R. Rep. No. 24–172 (1837).
233. See Reva B. Siegel, “Home As Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning
Wives’ Household Labor, 1850–1880,” Yale Law Journal 103 (1994): 1073–217.
234. Ibid., 1086–91.
235. Ibid., 1216–17, 1108–12.
236. See Hendrik Hartog, “Mrs. Packard on Dependency,” Yale Journal of Law and the
Humanities 1 (1988): 79.
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husband.237 At first blush, Packard’s energetic resistance to her husband’s
authoritarianism could be read as opposition to a larger sociolegal marital
regime that empowered husbands to control and chastise their wives. But
Hartog makes clear that, in her efforts to secure release from the asylum
and other forms of vindication, Packard did not seek freedom from mar-
riage laws’ constraints on wives’ agency. Rather, she sought the “right
to be a married woman”: the right, in other words, to the protection and
support that the institution of marriage was supposed to afford
women.238 In Hartog’s words, Packard wanted “legal confirmation of
some version of a distinctively female dependent status.”239 By the very
act of petitioning for pensions, and through the formulation of their claims,
widows seeking pensions sought a similar recognition, and the material
support that they urged should come with it.
To observe that proponents of military widows’ pensions reasoned within
traditional gender norms does not mean that the very public activities of
women petitioning for military pensions can be neatly folded into an account
of domesticity advocated bywomen such as Catharine Beecher, who insisted
on the private, moral foundation of women’s sphere.240 Beecher herself cri-
ticizedwomen’s participation in the abolitionist petition drives at least in part
because she feared that petitioning would lead women away from “their
appropriate retirement” and into the “arena of political collision.”241
Widows’ pension petitions made no claims to an overtly political role for
women, but they certainly drew women into a domain of formal legal and
political processes that were dominated by, if not often reserved for, men.
In this respect, widows’ pension petitions captured and reproduced the
seemingly contradictory cultural impulses that Nancy Cott has demon-
strated were characteristic of women’s position in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, and which solidified in the 1830s, a decade of particularly active
pension petitioning and legislation.242 As discussed previously, widows’




240. See Sklar, Catharine Beecher, 151–67.
241. Catharine E. Beecher, An Essay on Slavery and Abolitionism with Reference to the
Duty of American Females (Philadelphia: Henry Perkins, 1837), quoted in Zaeske,
Signatures of Citizenship, 115. Alisse Portnoy’s account of Catharine Beecher’s involve-
ment in the anti-removal petition campaign calls into question Beecher’s later suggestion
that women’s involvement in the abolitionist campaign was problematic because it brought
women into an “arena of public collision.” Instead, Portnoy argues, Catharine Beecher
objected to the abolitionist petition campaign because of her support for African colonization
as a remedy for slavery, instead of emancipation. Portnoy, Their Right to Speak, 13–14.
242. See Cott, The Bonds of Womanhood, 7–9.
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state consider women’s services in the domestic sphere, as well as their
vulnerability as dependents, as bases for public support. However, the peti-
tioning process also engaged thousands of women in a public-sphere
activity that, in the exact same decade, took on particular significance as
women employed the petition for abolitionist and anti-removal causes.243
Although very different in their ambitions, the women who participated
in these disparate petitioning exercises arguably laid the procedural foun-
dations for women’s increased involvement in the public sphere, both to
challenge and to harness the concept of domesticity in order to improve
women’s lot, legally and materially.
Taken as evidence of the law’s force in the everyday life of nineteenth-
century women, then, the experiences of the widows who petitioned
Congress in order to secure military pensions provide a textured picture
of how the law shaped women’s lives and how women shaped the law.
Like much legal argumentation today, the contemporary rationales offered
in support of widows’ pensions seem more expedient and improvisational
than overtly political with respect to women’s place in the polity. Whether
operating in a rarefied world like Susan Decatur or navigating the humbling
and byzantine bureaucracy of the Pension Office like Catharine Barr,
widows did their best to use the law’s processes and authority in order
to secure financial assistance. The fact that widows’ petitions—and the
reasoning they employed—were expedient does not render them any less
ideological. Ideology is one’s commonsense understanding of the way
the world works: “the conception of the world which is uncritically
absorbed” and reproduced through culture, social convention, political
practices, and law.244 Expedience led at least some widows and proponents
of military widows’ pensions to reason about these pensions as a “right” of
married women—a right that grew out of widows’ former status as wives.
Military widows’ pensions, therefore, stand as an example of women’s
everyday, instrumental use of law in a way that materially improved
their lives and, simultaneously, strengthened and entrenched marriage as
a source of women’s legal status and dependency.
Finally, perhaps what is most significant about the widows’ pension
petitions is that even as they reinforced marriage as a source of legitimacy
and structure for women’s citizenship, they also helped transform marriage
as an institution. Although marriage is often characterized as a private
relationship, it has long served a host of public functions as well.
243. See Zaeske, Signatures of Citizenship, 48–104; and Portnoy, Their Right to Speak,
52–86.
244. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, trans. and ed. Quintin
Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 242–46.
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Historically, however, marriage’s public functions generally did not
include creation of an entitlement to financial support from the govern-
ment. In America, that began to change in the early nineteenth century
with the development of federal military widows’ pensions. Under the pen-
sion statutes, military widows could claim support, not just from their hus-
bands’ estates or from other private parties, but from the public coffers.
The development of this novel form of legal entitlement—the public
marriage-based entitlement—signaled important transformations in the
legal and social meanings of marriage. During the early nineteenth century,
Americans came to understand that, under certain circumstances, marriage
gave a substantial class of women “virtually a vested right” to a public pen-
sion upon widowhood.245 In this respect, early nineteenth-century widows’
pension petitions helped bring about durable changes in the institution of
marriage–changes that continue to shape Americans’ understanding of
marriage and the many entitlements it creates to this day.
245. Mayo and Moulton, Army and Navy Pension Laws, XXVI–XXVII.
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